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Abstract 
At the core of this thesis is an attempt to address two primary questions: is Canada a 
middle power and how can we tell? As such, there are a variety of corollary questions: 
What is a middle power? What characteristics do middle powers have? And finally, is a 
state's middle power classification sourced in behavioural or capability characteristics? 
All of these questions are addressed here, and ultimately it is concluded that Canada is 
and was a middle power on the basis of the selected behavioural and capability 
indicators, and that both behaviour and capability are useful elements in differentiating or 
predicting whether a state is a middle, small, or great power. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
Canadian foreign policy has been dominated by a continuous preoccupation with 
place. 1 Conceptions concerning Canada's place and role in the world range from the 
flattering notion that Canada is a foremost, principal, or major power2 to the somewhat 
ignominious argument that Canada is a small, satellite, or dependent state/ whose 
autonomous success is due, in large part, to the goodwill of its southern neighbour. The 
most popular and prevailing argument, however, is that Canada is a middle power, a state 
that is neither the richest nor the poorest, the biggest nor the smallest, the most powerful 
nor the most impotent. Canada is a state, as John Holmes explained, that cannot accept 
the international responsibilities that the United States, Britain, or Russia (or even 
France) routinely shoulder, yet can certainly contribute more than, say, Panama.4 
Canada, it is argued, is a state that fits comfortably and neatly "in the middle," working 
hard to mitigate great states ' ambitions, contributing to an orderly and law-abiding 
international community, and assisting developing countries along a liberal economic 
path. The concept of Canada as a middle power influences foreign policy decisions and 
Canada's international image, and has been a central component of the Canadian identity 
at large. Canada is not expected to dominate the summer or winter Olympic Games, but 
to take home a modest sampling of gold, silver, and bronze medals. Canada is not 
expected to solve all the world's problems, but to address, perhaps, a few of the most 
pressing (or those considered to be within its limited reach). 
Despite the prevailing popularity of the image of Canada as a middle power, there 
is little understanding and few definitions of what constitutes a middle power. Further, 
there are few analytically rigorous empirical studies that attempt to examine the reality 
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behind the image. What is it about Canada and other self identified middle powers that 
warrant the perception of being "in the middle"? Are there certain physical or 
behavioural characteristics that offer a measure of place or status? Is there a yardstick by 
which Canada (and others) can be gauged, and through which Canada's middle power 
status can be affirmed? The literature concerning Canada as a middle power is vast, too 
vast to mention in even a cursory manner, yet notwithstanding this rich and diverse 
collection of thought, there is notably lacking any consensus as to the constitutive 
elements of a middle power. There have been many excellent attempts at providing the 
necessary clarification-Andrew Cooper, Richard Higgott and Kim Nossal's book 
Relocating Middle Powers (1993), Cranford Pratt's Middle Power Internationalism 
(1990), and Carsten Holbraad's Middle Powers in International Politics (1984) quickly 
come to mind-yet the debate has remained extremely diverse and generally obscured by 
a great deal of analytical clutter. The problem, of course, is the number of theoretical 
assumptions and methodological differences observers use to make (or contradict) the 
middle power claim. For example, Martin Wight's book Power Politics (1978) argued 
that military strength was the defining characteristic of a middle power.5 To the contrary, 
Eduard Jordaan's (2003) study of established and emerging middle powers suggested that 
it was types of behaviour (i.e., support for multilateral institutions) that distinguished 
middle powers from other types of states. Both approaches make several, often polar, 
assumptions concerning the nature and relevance of power and its measurement. 
Referring specifically to the Canadian context, the same comment can be made. As 
Maureen Molot noted, "[ d]ifferent interpretive and philosophical predispositions 
characterize the writing on Canadian foreign policy". 6 For example, Peyton Lyon and 
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Brian Tomlin's (1979) study of Canada in the international arena concluded that 
Canada's "place" in an international hierarchy was primarily a function of military, 
economic, and material and diplomatic resources.7 Cranford Pratt (1990), however, 
suggested that middle powers were instead characterized by cosmopolitan values and 
internationalist considerations,8 and that the middle powers were identifiable vis-a-vis the 
"role" they played in the international community. 9 
From the hortatory discourse, however, there have emerged two popular, though 
diverse, perspectives. On the one hand, middle power status is thought to reflect a state's 
physical capabilities. That is, because Canada's GNP, military capacity, or other 
empirical measures of power rank in the middle as compared to those of other states, 
Canada therefore qualifies as a middle power. On the other hand, Canada's middle 
power status is thought to rest on certain behavioural traits. For example, Canada's 
commitments to peacekeeping, overseas development or multilateralism are all 
considered characteristic of a middle power, and are pointed to as evidence of Canada's 
middle power status. While both the capability and behavioural perspectives have their 
own particular strengths and weaknesses, neither seems convincingly able to substantiate 
Canada's claim as a middle power. Despite the richness and diversity of the literature 
surrounding Canada's place or role in the world, 10 the question of Canada's status, and 
more generally, any consensus concerning which characteristics constitute a middle 
power, remains, unanswered and disputed. Can a broader empirical approach better 
determine what exactly makes a state a middle power, and thereby verify Canada's claim 
as such? 
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Therein lies the purpose of this thesis: it is an attempt to bring some conformity to 
what has thus far been an extremely diverse effort overall at characterising a middle 
power. It is an attempt to test which yardstick(s) bring meaning to the term, to examine 
the assertions of various middle power studies, and to ascertain the validity of Canada's 
claims to middle power status. The purpose, then, is not to define a middle power but to 
test which indicators, from both the behavioural and capability perspectives, best 
characterize states that have been referenced as middle powers, and the claim that Canada 
is a middle power. 
My thesis will identify and examine traditional power indicators and behavioural 
tendencies considered characteristic of a middle power which are outlined within the 
Canadian foreign policy literature and comparative middle power studies. Using 
discriminant analysis, those characteristics which best predict a state's status will be 
uncovered, and thereby provide a basis on which to test Canada's claim (and those of 
other states). Thus, there are two central questions: firstly, which capability and 
behavioural characteristics best distinguish the middle powers; and secondly, can 
Canada's status as a middle power be substantiated through such an approach? Fifty 
states, that have been referenced as great, middle, or small powers will be examined at 
three specific time points-1960, 1990, and 2000----in order to determine if there are 
indeed empirical characteristics that delineate these states hierarchically. The 
characteristics are broken into two groups: capability and behaviour. The capability 
group comprises three characteristics: total gross national product (GNP), military 
expenditure, and population. The behavioural group involves four characteristics: levels 
of official development assistance (ODA), number of multilateral agreements, 
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peacekeeping involvement, and demonstrated commitment to multilateralism (as 
measured by payment of its United Nations (UN) dues). 
This thesis comprises six chapters. Chapter Two outlines the ongms and 
development of the middle power debate within Canadian foreign policy and the different 
conceptions of what constitutes a middle power. It begins with an attempt to track the 
shift in how the middle power concept was defined and applied to Canadian foreign 
policy. It follows with an examination of the two general frameworks (capability and 
behaviour) through which observers premise a state's middle power status, and links 
either to general assumptions concerning the mechanics of the international system. 
The third chapter summarizes the different middle power studies and the 
constitutive elements of a middle power from the behavioural and capability perspectives. 
The first section links a particular middle power study to either the behavioural or 
capability camp. The second and third sections outline the indicators used by previous 
middle power studies and relate them to either framework. 
Chapter Four outlines the cases used in the analysis and sources of the empirical 
data, and provides a general overview of the data. The first section examines why the 
time points were selected and explains the a priori classification of states. The second 
and third sections deal directly with the sources of the raw data and link each with either 
the capability or behavioural perspective. The final section presents an overview of the 
raw data without reference to the statistical analysis, and suggests that the data do not 
offer any real insight into how states can be arranged hierarchically. 
Chapter five specifically concerns the statistical analysis. The first section 
explains the mechanics of discriminant analysis so that the reader may more easily 
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interpret the accompanying statistical output. The second section presents the results of 
the analysis and its interpretation, and suggests that there are characteristics that one can 
use to distinguish between small, middle, and great powers. The final section reviews the 
significant indicators, reviews which states were classified as middle powers and for 
which time point, and concludes that behaviour and capability are useful categories for 
determining the hierarchy of states. The final chapter (conclusion) summarizes the 
findings and points to certain weaknesses in the analysis. 
1 Maureen Molot, "Where do We, Should We, or Can We Sit? A Review of Canadian Foreign Policy 
Literature" International Journal of Canadian Studies 1-2 (Spring-Fall1990) 77. 
2 David Dewitt and John Kirton, Canada as a Principal Power (Toronto: John Wiley and Sons, 1983). 
3 James Minifie, Peacemaker or Powerdermonkey: Canada's Role in a Revolutionary World (Toronto: 
McClelland and Stewart, 1960). 
4 John Holmes, "Most Safely in the Middle" International Journal39 (Spring 1984) 366. 
5 Martin Wight, Power Politics (London: Leicester University Press, 1978) 295 . 
6 Molot, "Where do We, Should We, or Can We Sit" 78. 
7 Peyton Lyon and Brian Tomlin, Canada as an International Actor (Toronto: Macmillan Canada, 1979) 
72. 
8 Cranford Pratt, "Humane Internationalism" in Cranford Pratt (ed). Internationalism Under Strain: The 
North-South Policies of Canada, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden (Toronto: University ofToronto 
Press, 1989) 7. 
9 Pratt, "Comparisons and Prognosis" in Internationalism Under Strain 194. 
1<Molot, "Where do We, Should We, or Can We Sit" 78, 86. 
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Chapter Two: The Middle Power Framework 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the reader to the historical 
development of the middle power concept (and the subsequent debate) within Canadian 
foreign policy and outline some of the theoretical assumptions that underpin the two 
general perspectives by which observers have made the claim that Canada and others are 
middle powers. The first section begins with the introduction of the middle power 
concept at the end of the Second World War and follows its progression through to the 
end of the 1990s, and attempts to track the changes in how observers characterized a 
middle power. The second section deals with the two general approaches by which most 
observers determine a state's "middleness", and attempts to link either perspective to 
some general assumptions concerning the nature of international relations. The purpose 
of the second section is to provide some insight into how both perspectives derive 
significance from the indicators commonly used to characterize middle powers. 
2.1) The Origins and Development of the Middle Power Debate in Canadian Foreign 
Policy 
The Second World War marked a profound new beginning for Canada in terms of 
its attitude towards the international community and its place within that community. 
Prior to Hitler and Hirohito's continental ambitions, Canadian foreign policy had been 
content to mimic that of the British or Americans, which for the most part stressed 
protectionist and isolationist tendencies. 1 Indeed, such a policy had a significant appeal 
given the overall sense within the Canadian government that Canada was a small state, 
and small states "had to be cautious in a world of great powers; they had to know their 
place." 2 The Second World War, however, changed the mandarins' long held perception 
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of Canada as an inconsequential power and, concomitantly, of the corresponding role 
Canada should play on the international stage. The wartime growth of the nation in terms 
of economic and military capacity convinced many in the King government that Canada 
was no longer a minor player in the international arena. Coupled with this newfound 
sense of importance within the international community was the conviction that past 
policies of isolationism and protectionism had indirectly led to the outbreak of war. The 
physical and human cost of the fighting led many within the government to argue that it 
was inherently in the national interest of Canada to prevent the outbreak of any such 
future conflicts. 3 Consequently, Canadian foreign policy officials felt that the national 
interest could best be served through active participation in the international community. 
Thus, the close of the Second World War prompted a revision in thinking concerning 
Canada's status and the role Canada could therefore play to mitigate state rivalry and 
ambition. 
Mackenzie King, Hume Wrong, and Norman Robertson are credited with first 
articulating Canada's new and more dynamic role. The formation of the United Nations 
provided a unique forum wherein Canada could press for recognition of its newly 
invoked status as a middle power and practice its internationalist foreign policy. Initially, 
King, Wrong, and Robertson argued that Canada's middle power status, premised upon 
its economic and military growth, merited representation within various international 
institutions for which Canada was uniquely qualified. This sense of measured 
international importance, and the claim that Canada's international stature should be 
recognized within the international community, was first advanced through a variation of 
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Mitrany' s famous functional principle. 4 In an address to the House of Commons in late 
1943, King outlined his view for Canada's international role: 
Representation should be determined on a functional basis which will admit 
to full membership those countries, large or small, which have the greatest 
contribution to make to the particular object in question ... Some compromise 
must be found between the theoretical equality of states and the practical 
necessity of limiting representation ... That compromise can be discovered, 
especially in economic matters, by the adoption of the functional principle of 
representation. 5 
The functional principle of representation was a tactical argument, based upon the 
government's perceptions of Canada's middle power status, and designed to create a 
place-and corresponding influence-within the international community that Canada 
would not otherwise have had.6 Initially, then, the argument for Canada's status as a 
middle power was cloaked under the guise of the functional principle, which asserted that 
greater than small powers deserved such recognition within the international community. 
Denis Stairs has further elaborated on this point: 
What the middle powers held in common was the view that they ought to 
have more influence in the United Nations than the very small powers, while 
recognizing (with varying degrees of resignation) that they could not hope to 
have as much influence as the great powers. 7 
At the outset, the functional principle of representation was the means by which Canada 
could press for greater recognition as a middle power (a strategy that was largely rejected 
by the international community-Article 23 of the UN Charter notwithstanding), and 
thereby work to implement its internationalist foreign policy objectives and safeguard the 
national interest. As Lionel Gelber reasoned: 
What the middle power idea does, in brief, is to adopt the conclusions of 
realism, and extend them. Since major powers are differentiated by their 
greater functions from the rest, the Middle Powers ask that they be 
distinguished from the lesser ones by the same criteria. A voice in decisions 
should correspond with strength in enforcement. 8 
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The definition of a middle power at this point in Canadian history seemed to fit 
within a neat and concise framework. As John Holmes explained, with his signature and 
subtle wit, "at the end of the fifties we seemed to have it neatly defined. It had been 
conceived in the first place as a way of explaining to the world that Canadians were of 
greater consequence than the Panamanians but could not take on the responsibilities of 
the Americans, or even the French."9 The functional argument, however, proved largely 
ineffective in securing Canada a position of greater responsibility within the international 
community, including getting itself elected to various UN committees. As Wrong 
commented, "the functional principle may be accepted in theory [but] in electoral 
practice it will be mainly honoured in [the] breach."10 An alternative strategy was 
required to ensure that Canada could have a voice in international affairs that was, 
perhaps, commensurate with its self appointed middle power title. Canada's participation 
in the Suez Crisis is a good example of the method by which it hoped it could 
demonstrate to the world that it mattered. By shouldering the responsibility of 
peacekeeping or other international commitments, Canada could thus be privy to a 
portion of the influence reserved for great states. As Donald Gordon intimated, the 
international recognition Canada garnered from its active involvement in peacekeeping 
could influence policies and their implementation. He suggested, "If we say we are going 
to take our peacekeeping baseball and go home, sometimes it matters. When it does 
matter-as a threat or a negotiating instrument-then we can influence a policy."11 That 
is not to say that peacekeeping or other international commitments were undertaken with 
the narrow aim of establishing a "seat at the table"; such commitments fit firmly within 
the internationalist foreign policy that Canada had adopted, and were considered to 
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advance the national interest. As Tom Keating explained, peacekeeping and active 
participation in multilateral institutions were not undertaken, 
simply because they would enhance Canadian influence or offer a wider 
range of tasks for an expanding corps of diplomats; they were viewed as a 
way of entrenching a more stable and secure international order that would 
both support Canadian interests and yrovide an ongoing site in which 
Canadian representatives could operate. 1 
By intervening-either physically or rhetorically-between fractious parties as part of an 
internationalist foreign policy, Canada was able to help mitigate international tension in 
an increasingly polarized and hostile arena, which ultimately served to maintain 
international peace and security-however tenuous-and thereby satisfy the national 
interest. Accepting--or in Pearson's case, embracing-such responsibilities was 
calculated, in part, to create international recognition of Canada's status as a middle 
power. 
The concept underwent a subtle but distinct shift-at least in the Canadian 
context-in terms of how observers characterized a middle power. It had evolved from a 
static reflection of a state's capabilities to more of a particular style of foreign policy, and 
this special form of diplomacy was predicated "on the primacy of systemic peace as 
Canada's dominant foreign policy objective."13 Pearson argued that middle powers are 
"the backbone of the collective effort to keep the peace ... They have special 
responsibilities in this regard which they are proud to exercise."14 A middle power, 
therefore, had become something of an abstraction. At first conceived of as a reflection 
of Canada's growing economic and military power, the middle power classification was 
meant to differentiate middle powers from small, and in some cases large powers from 
states like Canada. With the failure of the functional argument to secure for Canada 
11 
institutional recognition of its "middleness," Canadian foreign policy officials sought an 
alternative method by which the middle power classification could become an entrenched 
feature of the international landscape. By supporting (and in some cases initiating) 
peacekeeping (Suez, Yemen, the Congo, and New Guinea), mediator or observer 
(Vietnam) roles, and multilateral institutions (UN), the Pearson government sought to 
create a niche framework through which middle powers could contribute to the 
international system. 
Thus, the role of a middle power, in an increasingly tense international arena, was 
thought to be a stabilizing element in international politics that, concomitantly, 
emphasized the need for greater cooperation and a system of rules by which international 
behaviour could be governed. 15 Painchaud's "middlepowermanship as an ideology"16 (a 
foreign policy that prioritized mediative diplomacy1 \ had a curious affect on the 
perception of a middle power. The distinction between a state's hierarchical rank-as 
determined by GNP or military expenditure-and its foreign policy became blurred. In 
1945, when the impression of Canada as a middle power emerged, there was a clear 
delineation between foreign policy and rank. That is, Canada sought international 
recognition as a middle power, and adopted a foreign policy that, it was felt, advanced the 
national interest. Of course, a state's hierarchical rank and its foreign policy may be 
related, but there still remains a clear distinction between the two; rank refers to the 
capability of a nation, and foreign policy refers to actual state behaviour. With the 
development of "middlepowermanship as an ideology" this distinction was harder to 
make. A middle power became a state that participated in the international arena in a 
specific manner, and the capability element-the original characteristic of a middle 
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power-became an ancillary feature. Thus, the role (or behaviour) a state played was 
the key determinant of its stature. 18 A middle power could be defined through a foreign 
policy that espoused peacekeeping, mediator, and multilateral roles, 19 and the term 
middle power "eventually came to connote a particular style in foreign policy. "20 
The conception of a middle power as role, Kim Nossal has argued, first emerged 
during the early 1960s, and has continued well into the present.21 As the Cold War 
progressed, further emphasis was placed on Canada's peacekeeping and internationalist 
commitments, and each successive peacekeeping operation or multilateral agreement 
served to strengthen the conception that a middle power could be identified vis-a-vis its 
behaviour. With the advent of the 1970s and the Trudeau government there was a further 
continuation of specific types of middle power behaviour. Despite Trudeau's attempts to 
downplay the idea that Canada could mediate all the world's conflicts, the durable 
terminology and traditional middle power roles, which he and his government had 
previously disparaged, nonetheless crept once again into Canadian foreign policy practice 
and rhetoric. 22 Somewhat ironically, Trudeau's insistence that Canada was "perhaps 
more the largest of the small powers than the smallest of the large powers"23 and his 
government's subsequent usage of middle power terminology may have served to 
reinforce the notion that a middle power was indeed identified by behaviour rather than 
capability. For example, in 1984, reporting to Parliament on his peace mission, he 
referred to "the need for a middle power role in defusing the tensions between the 
superpowers,"24 and during the 1970s, at the UN Law of the Sea Conference, Canada 
played a strong multilateral role characteristic of middle power behaviour.25 The 
abridgement of Canada's hierarchical rank, or the suggestion that Canada was the largest 
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of the small, contrasted with the Trudeau government's continued employment of middle 
power terminology to describe Canada's foreign policy and reinforced the impression 
that how a state contributed to the international system was indicative of its middle power 
classification. 26 
The same comment can be made of the Mulroney government during its 1984-
1993 tenure. Despite avoiding the terms middlepowermanship or middle power, the 
government's foreign policy still retained such characteristics. For example, Canada's 
limited involvement in the 1991 Gulf War was defended in traditional middle power 
terms.27 John Kirton wrote that the "central cause of Canada's combat commitment. .. 
[lay] .. .in the steady succession of atrocities perpetrated by Saddam Hussein, as they 
impacted a Canadian government conscious of its role in defending internatinal [sic] 
order."28 Moreover, Canada's peacekeepers were employed in a variety of missions 
during the Mulroney era, fulfilling a "classic middle power activity."29 The North-South 
Institute even summarized the Conservative party's record thus: "Canada's primary 
identification today is not that of a junior continental partner to a superpower, nor a 
second tier actor in the Western Summit Seven or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) .. .it is that of a vigorous, activist, middle power." 30 Again, a middle power was 
distinguished in behavioural terms. 
The continued description of Canada as a middle power, posited on its 
internationalist foreign policy and without any accompanying references to classical 
conceptions of power, characterized the Chretien government as well. Terms like "soft 
power" and "niche diplomacy" were commonly used to describe Canadian foreign policy, 
with the accompanying understanding that such terms referred to a confident middle 
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power (at least when used in the rhetoric of the Chretien government).31 However, the 
substantial downsizing of Canada's international aid programs and traditional capabilities 
(especially military capability) finally raised questions concerning the applicability of the 
term to describe Canada's categorical placement. The rhetoric of soft power and niche 
diplomacy, Nossal argued, seemed "little more than elaborate justification for not 
spending more on so-called "hard" power resources, such as well equipped military 
forces, well endowed intelligent services, and a diplomatic service that is not constantly 
being downsized and reorganized."32 The Chretien government responded by arguing 
that Canada's middle power status need no longer be premised upon traditional power 
indicators (capabilities). 33 Rather, changes within the international community required a 
new approach. Referred to-though somewhat sarcastically by Fen Hampson and Dean 
Oliver-as the Axworthy doctrine, the government's foreign policy priorities were 
premised on several core principles: the end of the Cold War vitally altered the nature of 
the international system; soft power was the new currency of international politics; 
military force had little utility; and human security should be the focus of governments 
rather than state security.34 The "new reality" suggested by Lloyd Axworthy35 required 
new strategies, and the Canadian government could reaffirm its middle power status by 
aggressively pursuing its human security agenda. The explicit suggestion was that 
Canadian foreign policy could selectively engage the international community despite a 
sharp reduction of resources, and still maintain the middle power tradition-and status-
that had so characterized earlier Canadian statecraft. Behaviour, it was argued, was 
enough to demonstrate Canada's status as a middle power. Capabilities, which had been 
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the original framework upon which Canada's middle power status had been asserted, 
were no longer important in the "new" international order. 
In sum, Canada's status as a middle power was originally premised on very 
distinct characteristics. A state was a middle power if its capabilities-however 
defined-ranked somewhere ahead of the smaller powers and somewhere behind the 
great powers. At the close of World War II, Canada sought a place in the international 
order that was proportionate with its growing economy and military establishment. As 
King intoned, in a speech that he gave to both British houses of Parliament, "We would 
wish our own right of representation, if not as one of the Big Three or Four, at least one 
of the middle powers, medium powers that should be brought into the world organization 
in some way that would recognize that power and responsibility go together."36 The 
desire for Canada to occupy a place of some importance within the international 
hierarchy-however justified- was ignored and the suggestion that Canada ought to have 
a right to special representation fell largely on deaf ears. Consequently, Canadian foreign 
policy adopted the view whereby participation within the international community could 
legitimate its middle power status. Canada's self-appointed middle power title came to 
represent its "particular style in foreign policy."37 Peacekeeping, mediator, and 
multilateral roles, according to some observers (Holmes and Painchaud for example) 
were thought to be the defining characteristics of a middle power. The duality of the 
middle power concept- or perhaps more accurately phrased, the tendency of observers to 
premise Canada's status as a middle power on either behaviour or capability 
characteristics-has led to a resurfacing of an old debate: what constitutes a middle 
power? It is to this question we now turn. 
16 
2.2) Different Conceptions of a Middle Power 
As noted previously, the Canadian middle power concept has undergone an 
important shift which reflects, in large part, the primary understanding of the 
international system. As Stairs explained, the realist ethos that typified Canadian foreign 
policy during the "Golden Age" of Canadian statecraft had been replaced by "a form of 
transnational politics in which sovereign states are in varying degrees subordinate and 
with which they must constantly curry favour." 38 The realist calculus39 typical of post-
World War II foreign policy shaped a specific understanding of how power was defined, 
constructed, and measured, and thus had a corollary implication as to how the actors in 
the international system were assumed to be ordered. In contrast, the myriad theoretical 
positions that emerged from the post-positivist movement of the 1960s, offered a number 
of different assumptions concerning the constitutive elements (and nature) of power and 
the subsequent categorization of states within an international hierarchy. The argument 
here is that the two primary positions from which the middle power argument is generally 
formulated rely on very different assumptions regarding the nature of power, and that 
authors from very different theoretical perspectives generally prefer one orientation over 
the other. The following section attempts to outline some of the assumptions inherent in 
either the capability or behavioural perspectives in order to gain insight into how each 
perspective derives significance from the indicators commonly used to characterize 
middle powers. 
The capability perspective has been articulated and refined by a number of 
authors. Most notable of these have been Bernard Wood (1988), Carsten Holbraad 
(1984), Michael Handel (1981), Peyton Lyon and Brian Tomlin (1979), and Martin 
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Wight (1978). The capability perspective generally makes several specific assumptions 
that relate to the competitive and conflictual aspects of international relations. The 
continuity of the human condition-read Hobbesian-or the continuity of the anarchic 
structure of the international system, the capability perspective assumes, creates an 
element of insecurity within the international arena. This insecurity is seen as the central 
problem in international relations, and the quest for power becomes the primary 
motivation for all political action. Thus, quantitative measurements of power and 
security have become the favoured indicators of the capability perspective. Kenneth 
Waltz and Robert Art have more clearly summarized the assumptions of the capability 
perspective and its subsequent reliance on empirical sources of power. They write, 
States coexist in a condition of anarchy. If one state is attacked by another, 
no means of protection are available other than those which the attacked state 
is able to muster. No authoritative agency can be called upon to resolve 
disputes among states. In conducting their foreign policies, therefore, 
statesmen [sic] often find it convenient or necessary to use force or to 
threaten to do so. Military force is important, if not central, to international 
relations. It brings some order out of chaos, and it helps to make and enforce 
the rules of the game. 40 
Power politics provides the basis for determining a state's international standing. The 
theoretical premise of the capability perspective is simply that power is the guiding force 
in international relations, and that sovereign states are the key international actors.41 The 
capability perspective is firmly rooted in the positivist sphere, and a state's power is 
rooted in quantifiable indicators. Thus, power is "based on, and derived from, a wide 
range of capabilities, meaning the resources, tangible and intangible, which contribute to 
the capacity to control the outcomes of interactions.'.42 Power is correlated with GNP, 
military expenditure, population, or a host of other indicators; the power of the state is a 
direct reflection of its GNP, military expenditure, population, or some other indicator. A 
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middle power is a state, quite simply, that has neither a large nor small GNP, military, or 
population etc. For example, Bernard Wood's study of middle powers used GNP as its 
defining indicator; states whose GNPs ranked below the largest states would "seem to 
capture all those which would likely be proposed as middle-power candidates."43 Indeed, 
the inclination of the capability perspective to a positivist approach was neatly summed 
by R.A. Mackay, who suggested that "to attribute to a quantitative term a moral, or 
ideological, or political content seems to me to clutter thought rather than to clarify it."44 
The notion that middle power status is rooted in a state's behaviour takes as its 
starting point that international relations are not characterized by continuous state 
insecurity. Instead, the behavioural approach often assumes that interdependence and 
world society are the primary motivation for international political action. Brian 
Stevenson explains further: 
Since the late 1960s debates in international relations theory have focused on 
whether the international political order has been going through a 
fundamental change from a state-centric system where high politics prevail to 
a new interdependent system where low politics will direct the growing 
interconnectedness of the world. This emerging new international order, it is 
argued, will eventually limit the capacities of states (especially the 
superpowers) to interact within the logic of realpolitik. This body of thought 
points to the growth of international communication and multinational 
corporations, and to the proliferation of international regimes and institutions, 
all of which limit the traditional power of states. It thus points to the great 
limitations of military might in this changing world order and to the growing 
importance of economic and social relations.45 
While the international structure is still anarchic, states are seen to champion more 
altruistic priorities like human rights, multilateral regimes, and cooperation, rather 
than the balance of power, state autonomy, or security as often assumed by those 
who favour the capability perspective. Moreover, a common premise within the 
behavioural position is the decline of the state as the sole unitary actor within 
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international relations. The emergence of multinational corporations, greater 
cooperation and interaction between states, and the proliferation of international 
regimes and institutions, as Stevenson argues, all serve to limit the ability of states 
to act in a manner consistent with assumptions generally held by the capability 
perspective- implying that the capability perspective's perceptions of power does 
not reflect international politics. Thus, from the behavioural point of view, power 
is located within multilateral institutions and processes, and a state's middle power 
status is derived from its participation in and support for such institutions.46 
Generally, the capability perspective suffers from two criticisms: power is 
notoriously difficult to define, 47 and merely possessing capabilities do not 
necessarily predict a state' s (middle power) status.48 As Nossal has argued, any 
empirical measurement of power is fraught with difficulty since it is "impossible to 
demonstrate a country's power objectively or scientifically. Any assessment of a 
state's power will always be subjective and, thus, variable."49 Critics of the 
capability perspective argue that indicators like GNP, military expenditure etc., are 
insufficient in determining which states are, or are not, middle powers. Rather, it is 
the manner in which a state employs its capabilities that determine its status as a 
middle power. That is, a state's behaviour is a more comprehensive, and therefore 
a more reliable, measure of a state's claim for middle power status. 50 
The behavioural perspective's ability to characterize middle powers51 too 
attracts some measure of criticism. Part of the problem stems from the lack of 
cohesiveness of the behavioural approach, since many of the authors that favour the 
behavioural method come from very different theoretical traditions. And while the 
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behavioural perspective has thus far been described as a more or less consistent 
theoretical method, a close examination of various middle power studies indicates 
variations on a theme. Each premises a state's middle power status on its 
multilateralist or internationalist behaviour, but employs different measures of those 
types of behaviour. For example, Andrew Cooper, Richard Higgott and Kim 
Nossal's conception of a middle power emphasised the degree to which a state's 
foreign policy is "geared to mitigating conflict and building consensus and 
cooperation."52 For Cranford Pratt, however, middle power behaviour is 
characterized by "humane internationalism," which he defined as the ethical 
component of a state's foreign policy that, at its core, eschews the use of force to 
pursue national goals, engenders respect for human rights and human rights 
regimes, and embraces an understanding that industrialized states have a moral 
obligation to those beyond their borders. 53 Thus, the cogency of the behavioural 
perspective loses ground in terms of being a unified middle power approach. As 
Heather Smith and David Black explained, the behavioural approach implies a 
degree of "selectivity and inconsistency in the performance of middle power roles, 
limiting the extent to which they can be generalized."54 In other words, the wide 
array of roles (or behaviours) said to characterize middle powers make it difficult to 
say, with any certainty, which states are indeed middle powers. 
Generally, the two primary positions (capability or behaviour) from which 
observers premise Canada and other state's middle power status rests on very 
different assumptions concerning the mechanics of the international system. Such 
assumptions have a corollary impact on the types of indicators observers use to 
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justify whether or not a state is a small, middle, or great power. We now turn to an 
examination of the various characteristics proponents of either option have 
previously employed. 
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Chapter Three: The Elements of a Middle Power 
The grading of a state based upon its material capability or behavioural traits is 
not a new tendency within international relations. States have been categorized by their 
relative capabilities and/or behaviour since the creation of the inter-state system.1 At first 
glance this seems to be a simple concept; the gradation of states implies that states with 
different capacities have different roles to play in the international system.2 Aristotle and 
Thomas Aquinas both referred to a type of state, or polis, which was neither a significant 
nor insignificant power. 3 A middle power was a state that could ensure its own security 
without assistance from other states. For comparison, a great state was a power that had 
influence over its neighbours. A small state required the support and protection of other 
states.4 Giovanni Botero, a teacher of philosophy and rhetoric in Milan in 1589, divided 
states into three classes. He wrote, 
Some dominions are small, others large, others medium; and these are not 
absolute but comparative, and with respect to their neighbours ... Middle-sized 
states are the most lasting, since they are exposed neither to violence by their 
weakness nor to envy by their greatness, and their wealth and power being 
moderate, passions are less violent, ambition finds less support and licence 
less provocation than in large states. 5 
As an organizing concept for international relations, the term middle power did not 
come into common usage until the end of the Second World War.6 Prior to this period 
international relations was typically analysed from a great power focus, which made a 
good deal of sense given that most of the rest of the world's peoples lived in colonies or 
dependent states. With the end of the Second World War and the emergence ofbipolarity 
and nascent European and non-European states, an analysis of international relations 
from solely a great power focus became less than satisfactory, and unable to explain 
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adequately the mechanics of the international system.7 What emerged was an interesting, 
though as yet incomplete, examination of middle powers and their constitutive elements. 
The purpose of chapter three-after that admittedly long segue-is to outline the 
various elements of a middle power as mentioned in the literature. The first section 
reviews some of the literature and links each author with either the capability or 
behaviour perspective. The second and third sections examine the specific indicators 
used by various middle power studies and establishes which indicators are to be used in 
this analysis. 
3.1) The Constitutive Elements of a Middle Power 
As mentioned previously, the capability perspective generally relies on a specific 
understanding of power and international relations. Not surprisingly, the majority of 
middle power studies incorporate similar, if not identical, capability indicators. Martin 
Wight (1978), in his book Power Politics, suggested that military strength was the 
capability variable that most clearly identified the middle powers. He felt that, "a middle 
power is a power with such military strength that in peacetime the great powers bid for its 
support, and in wartime, while it has no hope of winning a war against a great power, it 
can hope to inflict costs on a great power out of proportion to what the great power can 
inflict on it."8 Realizing that his definition was somewhat arbitrary, he listed several 
examples of middle powers, which included: Canada, Australia, Brazil, Mexico, Poland, 
Holland, Belgium, Sweden, Yugoslavia, and Egypt. For Wight, military strength 
represented the sum of numerous factors-like GNP and population for example-and 
therefore it was redundant to include any other indicator in his analysis. 
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Holbraad (1984) asserted that middle powers could be best distinguished "in 
terms of the strengths they possess and the power they command. If the power of a 
nation is defined as its ability to impose its will on other states and to resist attempts by 
other states to impose on itself.. .the force of a nation may be defined as the means by 
which it exercises this power."9 The best single indicator of this force, he surmised, was 
GNP, since it was a function ofthe 
material and moral factors that make up power, including population, 
[geographical] area, location, resources, organisation and leadership .. .it 
indicates potential as much as actual military power, and therefore neither 
overrates countries that for reasons of choice or necessity have assumed a 
military posture much higher than they maintain in the long run, nor 
underrates countries that have not had occasion to convert a sizable 
proportion of the economic force into military strength. 10 
Another proponent of GNP as the sole indicator of a state's middle power status was Eric 
Hanson (1966), who suggested that Canada's post war economy defined it as a middle 
power, provided that it could maintain a high rate of economic growth as compared to 
other states. GNP was the best factor in determining the middle power status of state 
because, like Holbraad, he believed it was a composite of the various factors that make 
up power.ll Likewise, Bernard Wood's study (1988) relied on GNP as the defining 
element of a middle power. Citing thirty-three states whose GNP ranked below the "half 
dozen or so great states"12 and fell between US$400 billion and US$40 billion, Wood 
argued that the defining aspect of a middle power was capability as measured by GNP. 13 
Michael Handel (1981) suggested that middle powers can be placed into two 
groups: those states that have small populations but are highly developed and have 
efficient economies, and those states which have high population densities but are 
economically less developed. 14 Handel went further, saying that the first group of middle 
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powers can be divided into two sub-groups: the declining and emerging middle powers. 
Canada and Australia, he suggested, are emerging powers because of their geographical 
size and enormous surplus of natural resources. The declining middle powers are those 
states that in the past had impressive economic performance, but had declined in terms of 
their relative power. As examples, he listed Italy, Japan, and Spain, and suggested that 
perhaps the United Kingdom and France may, in the future, be added to this list. Brazil, 
Mexico, and India, he argued, are states that fit into the second class of middle power 
states; that is, those states that have large populations but have smaller, or less developed, 
economies. 
Laura Neack's study (1993) of middle powers employed five capability 
indicators: population, military expenditures per capita, GNP per capita, literacy rate, and 
infant mortality per thousand live births. 15 The first three, Neack argued, were typically 
used separately or in some combination as measures of national power, autonomy, or 
national wealth. 16 Likewise, Neack argued that the literacy rate was a measure of 
educational development, and the infant mortality rate was a measure of the general 
health and well being of the population. 17 
Lyon and Tomlin's study (1979) of Canada in the international arena was also, in 
part, an examination of capabilities. Though they acknowledged that "[s]implistic 
notions about the centrality of national power in international relations are now widely 
rejected" and that "the existence of power may well be best inferred from observing 
behaviour, especially the outcome of conflicts,"18 they used traditional capability 
indicators in their analysis. The analysis included four distinct index scores, with the 
fifth-"relative capabilities"- being a composite of those four scores. The four index 
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scores were entitled military, economic, resource, and diplomatic, and each was derived 
from a number of relevant indicators. For example, the military index was composed of 
three indicators: total military expenditure, size of armed forces, and military 
expenditures per individual in the armed forces. 19 
Unlike the capability perspective, analysts who take a behavioural position 
incorporate a number of different indicators, and while all reflect the behaviour of a state, 
each tends to operate from very different theoretical assumptions and thus use a wide 
array of behavioural indicators. In Cooper, Higgott and Nossal's book, Relocating 
Middle Powers (1993), the behavioural indicators included: the pursuit of multilateral 
solutions to international problems, the tendency to embrace notions of good international 
citizenship to guide diplomacy, and the tendency to embrace compromise positions in 
international disputes.2° Canada and Australia, it was argued, qualified as middle powers 
because they "tended to embrace such notions in their public statements, even when they 
did not use the words middle power.'m The authors point to Australian and Canadian 
diplomatic efforts during the late 1980s and early 1990s, which they felt were geared 
toward "mitigating conflict and building consensus and cooperation" 22 and therefore 
indicative of a middle power state. They also noted, however, that such behaviour was 
cloaked in a healthy dose of "enlightened self-interest."23 
Cooper (1997) went a step further, when he argued that there is a "constellation of 
middle power behaviour,"24 which suggested that middle powers exhibit a particular and 
specific type of statecraft. Cooper wrote that middle powers all "emphasize coalition 
building and cooperation building," all demonstrate "some degree of entrepreneurial 
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and/or technical leadership," and all have "adopted, on a selective basis, the role of 
catalyst and facilitator."25 
Cranford Pratt (1989) also defined middle powers through a behavioural lens. 
Pratt argued that middle power states are generally characterized by cosmopolitan values 
and internationalist considerations.26 In particular, middle power states are those that 
espouse a foreign policy of "humane internationalism," and an acceptance "by the 
citizens of the industrialized states that they have an ethical obligation towards those 
beyond their border."27 For Pratt, the four states that best embodied the humane 
internationalist perspective were Canada, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Norway. Within 
each, Pratt contended, there had emerged a "more than average sensitivity to the 
aspirations and development needs of the LDCs (less developed countries )"28 which had 
in tum translated into a foreign policy that emphasised a strong commitment to a 
constructive international role, a preference for multilateral values, and the adoption of 
humane internationalism as a guiding ethical component of international relations. 
John Holmes and Paul Painchaud (1966) are, arguably, the founding fathers of the 
behavioural perspective within Canadian foreign policy. Though Holmes was a sceptic 
of the rhetorical excesses of a middle power, and in particular the middlepowermanship 
that was said to characterize Canadian foreign policy, he nonetheless recognized the 
utility that the middle power classification provided to the foreign policy of a state (in 
particular Canada). Holmes suggested that, "without some definition of its status, both to 
discipline itself within its limitations and to be aware of its opportunities, a state and its 
citizens are likely to flounder ineffectually or turn nasty and neurotic."29 For Holmes, as 
distasteful as the term was, particularly since "its [middle power] achievements have 
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inevitably been so far short of its pretensions that it can be made to sound flatulent,"30 a 
middle power could be identified by the role, or behaviour, that it chose-Dr was able-
to pursue. By engaging in mediator positions or peacekeeping operations, a state was 
able to perform a middle power role despite being handicapped with a small GNP or 
military expenditure. Holmes cited Tunisia as an example.31 And though he argued that 
the middle power status of a state was fleeting and intangible, particularly if "one 
attempts to list those countries which have earned the designation of middle powers by 
performance beyond mere existence with intermediate-class statistics,"32 he grudgingly 
admitted that such status was best indicated by a state's behaviour. 
Painchaud' s assessment of the concept of a middle power was far less critical than 
Holmes's. The methodological difficulties inherent in the analysis and measurement of 
power in the international system, he argued, warranted the abandonment of the 
capability approach as a defining argument of a state's middle power status.33 A middle 
power should be identified through a particular style of foreign policy rather than through 
a rough assessment of a state's capability to hold its own in an anarchic international 
arena. Painchaud, somewhat blandly, suggested that this certain type of foreign policy 
"expresses, beyond each particular decision, an intention and continuing aims which 
'delineate' the global international policy of states which claim it."34 A state was a 
middle power because of the role it chose to play, rather than as a measurement of its 
capability vis-a-vis other states. For Painchaud (as for others), such middle power roles 
included: mediator diplomacy and peacekeeping support of multilateral institutions, and 
development assistance for underdeveloped states. 35 
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Eduard Jordaan's study (2003) of established and emergmg middle powers 
pointed to two different types of behaviour endemic of middle powers. Traditional 
middle powers, he argued, tended to prioritize behaviour that reinforced the hegemonic 
world order-activities that either supported or preserved the status quo. For example, 
Canada's peacekeeping efforts, or participation in the General Agreement on Trade and 
Tariffs (GATT) legitimizes and sustains the prevailing hegemonic order. Emerging 
middle powers, however, can be identified by behaviour that attempts to reform the 
liberal capitalist order said to characterize the current hegemonic international arena. 
J ordaan wrote that, 
[the] semblance of solidarity among developing states provided by the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the Non-
Aligned Movement (NAM) provides emerging middle powers (which often 
fulfill leadership roles within these organizations) with the opportunity of 
gaining access to the markets of developing states masked by rhetorical 
references to South-South cooperation and Third World solidarity. As a 
result, emerging middle powers states [sic] adopt reformist positions at the 
most radical, although they do occasionally challenge hegemonic rudiments, 
thereby strengthening ties with the minnows in their geographic immediacy 
and in South-dominated international organizations. 36 
Robert Keohane (1969) drew many of the same conclusions concernmg the 
definition of a middle power.37 He argued that the international system is determined by 
state behaviour, and that the systemic roles states play can lead to distinctions between 
them. That is, instead of focussing on how a state's resources determine whether security 
can be maintained, behaviour should be the defining characteristic of a state's place 
within the international system. He listed three types of states: a "system-determining 
state," a "system influencing" state, and finally a "system affecting" state. The first type 
played a "critical role in shaping the system." In the second category are states that 
cannot individually dominate a system but may be able to "influence its nature through 
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unilateral as well as multilateral actions." Finally, there are those states that can never 
affect the system alone, but by working through small groups or alliances or "universal or 
regional organizations" can influence international behaviour. He then defined a middle 
power as a state that cannot act alone effectively, "but may be able to have a systemic 
impact in a small group or through international institutions."38 Moreover, Keohane 
argued that the types of international organizations to which middle powers subscribe are 
those that develop an "international political culture" which allow middle power states to 
act collectively to "help shape developing international attitudes, dogmas, and codes of 
proper behaviour."39 
Annette Baker Fox (1977) developed a rather unique and sophisticated approach 
that fits firmly in the behavioural camp. Instead of simply examining the behaviour of 
middle powers and highlighting commonalities, Baker Fox examined the relationship 
between middle powers and a great power, and attempted to track commonalities within 
that relationship. Baker Fox suggested that the characteristics that existed in the 
relationship between the United States and her four selected middle powers (Canada, 
Mexico, Brazil, and Australia) could probably be observed in those countries "attracted to 
and in tum attractive to only one major power and to cases where the expectation of 
violence or coercion is absent in a complex system of actions".40 Thus, for Baker Fox a 
middle power was defined by a wide range of behaviours that depended not only upon 
the middle power but on a third-party as well-typically the United States. 
There is a third perspective which I have thus far ignored, and it, generally 
speaking, represents a composite of both behavioural and capability indicators. That is, a 
middle power would empirically rank in the middle in terms of capabilities and at the 
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same time seek to strengthen multilateral arrangements or international peace and 
stability. Robert Cox's middle power definition was firmly rooted on this premise. He 
acknowledged the importance of capability, but suggested that capability alone was 
insufficient to qualify a state as a middle power. For Cox, a middle power could be 
defined as follows: 
The middle power is likely to be in the middle rank of material capabilities, 
but it also stands in the middle in situations of conflict. It seeks to expand the 
area of common ground which will make it possible to curtail risk in the 
management of conflict. Possessing mid-range capability (military or 
economic) is a necessary condition of ability to play this role; but it is not an 
adequate predictor of a disposition to play it. An ability to take a certain 
distance from direct involvement in major conflicts, a sufficient degree of 
autonomy in relation to major powers, a commitment to orderliness and 
security in inter-state relations and to facilitating of orderly change in the 
world system are critical elements for fulfillment of the middle power 
role ... we can say that the middle power is a role in search of an actor.41 
From Cox's perspective, then, a middle power was characterized by physical capabilities 
and by working "in the middle towards cooperative internationalism."42 International 
efforts like peacekeeping or commitment to multilateral institutions coupled with the 
requisite physical capabilities qualified a state as a middle power. The logic, as Cox 
indicated, was that capability provides the necessary capacity to engage the international 
community in a manner consistent with the liberal internationalist ethic. A middle power 
would operate in an international arena that recognizes the utility of the realist or neo-
realist conception of power and a liberal internationalist commitment to multilateral 
institutions and processes. This is the approach taken by Louis Belanger and Gordon 
Mace, who argued that a middle power can be recognized because it "occupies a position 
in the hierarchy of power just next to that of the superpowers" and "models its behaviour 
in accordance with a role conception that includes an inclination towards good 
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international citizenship, multilateral activism, coalition-and institution building, and 
mediation."43 R.G. Riddel was one of the first to suggest that middle powers could be 
defined as those states that "by reason of their size, their material resources, their 
willingness to accept responsibility, and stability are close to being great powers.'.44 
Even Botero's comments (cited earlier) can be interpreted in a manner consistent with 
characterizing a middle power by both capability and behaviour indicators.45 
The two broad frameworks used to conceptualize and define middle powers are 
difficult to compare. The capability perspective, on the one hand, is typically used to 
organize states of all sizes into rigid and typically static categories. A middle power is a 
state that simply ranks in the middle; it has less of one (or more) type of aggregate 
indicator than other states. The behavioural perspective, on the other hand, assumes that 
middle powers act differently and distinctly; their behaviour is a unique phenomenon not 
easily subjected to quantitative comparison. Nevertheless, the following section attempts 
to identify the specific indicators usually mentioned as important and link them to either 
the capability or behavioural perspective. 
3.2) A Middle Power as Characterized by Capability 
Total Gross National Product (GNP) has been used in the majority of capability 
based middle power studies, and can be found in studies that employ the behavioural 
perspective as well. For example, Jordaan's article concerning emerging and traditional 
middle powers suggested that though behaviour is the most significant criterion of a 
middle power, traditional middle powers, nevertheless, can be located at the core of the 
world economy, and have GNP's which reflect their central position in that economy.46 
Wood argued that GNP "automatically captures aggregate economic power, wealth 
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and/or population size, and to a substantial extent, military potential."47 Holbraad too, 
argued that though GNP is a crude measure of power, it is an adequate primary indicator 
of a state's hierarchical position.48 Likewise, Neack acknowledged that GNP is a 
measure of national power, and though it can be ontologically biased, it nevertheless 
provides a "utilitarian" function in that it delineates states in a hierarchical fashion. 49 
Hanson also defended the use of GNP, and argued that though power is a composite of a 
number of factors, "it [GNP] is deemed by many observers to be the best single objective 
indicator of the power of a nation". 5° For many, GNP, or its variant GDP, reflects in 
absolute terms the capabilities of a state, and the popularity of GNP as middle power 
indicator provides a strong justification to incorporate it within this thesis. 
The second capability indicator routinely used is military expenditure. Like GNP, 
military expenditure is often considered to be the closest approximation of a state's 
tangible power; military expenditure has been used in numerous middle power and, more 
generally, power studies. Michael Handel's study of weak states in the international 
system ranked states in terms of military power, and he derived military power from a 
variety of sources. Amongst these were population-which he cited as the most 
important indicator of a state's military power-GNP per capita, and total military 
expenditure. Despite being third in terms of relative influence, Handel made it clear that 
though total military expenditure is in part related to population and GNP, it is 
nevertheless a clear determinant in delimiting a state in terms of rank. 51 Another 
proponent of military expenditure as a measurement of a state's middle power status was 
Martin Wight, who contended that sea and land power, as reflected by a state's military, 
and in tum reflected by that state's military spending, were the defining characteristics of 
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a state's hierarchical rank. 52 Neack's study of middle powers is another example of an 
analysis that used total military expenditure as a middle power indicator. Neack, like 
Wight and Handel, argued that total military expenditure is a good approximation of a 
state's national power and autonomy, and can serve as a useful guide in demarcating 
states in the international system.53 Lyon and Tomlin thought that total military 
expenditure was considered by most observers to be the single most important indicator 
of national power. Though the "number and variety of state attributes which might be 
included in the assessment of national power are almost limitless ... primary emphasis [is] 
placed on military capability."54 Like GNP, therefore, the apparent utility and popularity 
of total military expenditure make its inclusion in the statistical analysis of this thesis 
quite simple. 
The third capability indicator selected is total population. Though less popular 
than either GNP or military expenditure, total population is still a favoured capability 
indicator. It provides an estimate of a state's resources that, it is argued, if employed 
correctly, are capable of positively affecting a state's power. The argument is that a state 
like India, though less powerful than Denmark, Italy, or Norway, has the potential, 
because of its large population, to become as, or more, powerful than Denmark, Italy, or 
Norway, if its citizens were to be utilized in a more efficient and productive manner-
that is, in a manner consistent with liberal economic values. 55 Thus, population is used as 
a measure of national power and wealth. 56 Population, as Holbraad wrote, when used in 
concert with other indicators one can avoid the problem of "rank inconsistency," which is 
the tendency of states' rankings to differ according to the indicator used. In other words, 
a state may, when ranked on the basis of GNP alone, "find itself in a much higher, or 
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lower, position when ranked with reference to a more specific indicator of power."57 
Population can also provide a more permanent measurement of power in the long term 
than GNP or military expenditure given that population is less likely to experience 
significant or abrupt changes. 58 Despite the less prevalent use of total population as a 
middle power indicator, its apparent utility-or the "fact" that total population may 
indicate potential power- makes its incorporation within the statistical analysis 
appropriate. 
3.3) A Middle Power as Characterized by Behaviour 
As noted earlier, the behavioural perspective employs a wide range of behaviour 
types, but most are indicators of a state's support for multilateralism or internationalism. 
For example, Pratt's "humane internationalism" envisions foreign policy behaviour that 
is conceptually and practically different than that envisaged in Cox's middle power 
definition. Four behavioural indicators have been chosen because they seem to represent 
best either internationalist and/or multilateral behaviour. Of course, there may be other 
measures of internationalist or multilateralist behaviour. 
Support for multilateral institutions is often listed as a characteristic of middle 
power behaviour. Cooper, Higgott and Nossal, for example, cited Canada and Australia's 
involvement in the Cairns group 59 as an example of the multilateral behaviour of middle 
power states.60 Richard Stubbs and Kim Nossal suggested that middle powers, generally, 
have "an abiding preference for multilateralism rather than bilateral approaches to 
statecraft; middle powers also manifest a marked preference for conducting their 
diplomacy in the context of international institutions."61 Baker Fox argued that middle 
powers had a preference for multilateral institutions, since they were more likely to 
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"catch the eye of the Americans for some desired policy shift".62 Perhaps the best 
example of a multilateral institution is the UN. If so, then one way to gauge a state ' s 
support for the UN is through an examination of its payment of UN dues. David 
Protheroe suggested that while payment of UN dues alone is not a comprehensive 
indicator of a state' s commitment to multilateralism, it nevertheless provides a good 
"snapshot," and gives a "general sense of the middle power record in financing 
multilateralism."63 Indeed, self described middle powers states are quick to point to their 
own record of support for the UN and the importance for member states to fund the UN 
and its agencies. In a 1997 memorandum to the Secretary-General, the self described 
sixteen middle power group64 urged the international community to make good on their 
financial commitments. The group stressed that international problems were the purview 
of the UN, and its member states should "pay their assessed dues in full, on time, and 
without conditions."65 Payment of UN dues, therefore, seems to be a good indicator of a 
state's support for multilateral institutions. 
Another example of support for multilateral processes and institutions is physical 
involvement within such institutions; just as payment of UN dues provides a "snapshot" 
of a state's commitment to multilateralism, so too does participation within multilateral 
processes. Again, the UN provides a useful forum wherein state participation within 
multilateral processes can be observed. Ratifying multilateral treaties that pertain to the 
workings of the UN or codes of international behaviour should give an indication of a 
state's preference for and support ofmultilateralism. Stubbs and Nossal, in their defence 
of Malaysia's claim for middle power status, wrote that Malaysia-as other middle 
powers- has been "very supportive of the United Nations ... and [such support is] 
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symboli.:: of Malaysia's commitment to multilateralism and of its rise to the ranks of a 
middle power. "66 Belanger argued that middle powers, in the "context of an 
asymme,:rical distribution of power," tend to be extremely sensitive to their relative 
position of influence within the international hierarchy and therefore seek out and build 
instituticns whereby they can participate "in the governance established by states to make 
institutic ,nal co-operation work."67 Thus, examining states' support of multilateralism 
through an examination of the various actors' participation within multilateral treaties 
should be probative. 
Peacekeeping 1s perhaps the most often cited example of internationalist 
behaviour. Andrew Boyd stated that middle powers "possessed the specialized men [sic] 
and equipment and the political sophistication that are necessary'' for peacekeeping 
operations.68 Peacekeeping has been central to Canada's claim as a middle power, and it 
has sha:Jed the definition of "Canada's national identity, role and influence in the 
world."~ 9 Holmes wrote that the "art and science" of peacekeeping is of special interest 
to Canadians, and has done much to shape Canada's role in international affairs.70 
Geoffre:r Hayes has suggested that if Canada "can be considered a model middle power, 
then pe::.cekeeping has been for Canadians a classic middle power activity.'m Kimberley 
Marten-Zisk wrote that most middle power states, like Canada, India, Pakistan, Sweden, 
Poland, and France, are "regular troop contributors to UN peacekeeping operations," and 
that active involvement in UN peacekeeping operations is a means by which these states 
can "e>:ert greater influence on world events than would otherwise be possible."72 
Peaceh:eping, therefore, seems like a universal middle power characteristic, and thus its 
inclusion as a behavioural indicator of a middle power seems a foregone conclusion. 
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Like peacekeeping and support for multilateral institutions, Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) is argued to be a key determinant of a state's middle power status 
(though this criterion should really only apply to developed middle powers). Central to 
Pratt's definition of a middle power is the understanding that middle power states' 
foreign policies reflect what he refers to as "humane internationalism" and a significant 
component of a humane internationalist foreign policy is the development assistance 
provided by those states.73 David Black suggested ODA can be a way for middle powers 
to distinguish "themselves, both at home and abroad, from most larger powers, and can 
be a way of enhancing their reputations and (indirectly) their influence in certain 
international forums."74 An examination of the levels of ODA of states should thus 
provide evidence of their commitment to an internationalist foreign policy and their 
subsequent claim for middle power status. 
Though the seven characteristics are usually identified with a particular way of 
defining a middle power i.e., total population or GNP indicates capability, or ODA 
indicates behaviour-there is a slight "blurring of the edges". The delineation between 
capability and behaviour is not quite as rigid as the categories suggest. For example, 
payment of UN dues is clearly a behavioural trait. A state either pays its dues or it does 
not. However, the amount of funds a state is required to surrender to the UN is based 
upon the ability of the state to pay: Canada is required to fund the UN to a greater degree 
than, say, Bolivia.75 Thus, payment ofUN dues, though a behavioural characteristic, still 
shares a relationship with capability. The same is true for military expenditure. 
Obviously, the amount a state spends on its military is a function and indication of its 
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capability. However, the decision to increase or decrease military spending is ultimately 
a political one and reflects a state's choices about its behaviour. 
In sum, this chapter sought to outline the various indicators typically used to 
identify middle powers and link them to either the behavioural or capability approach. 
Generally speaking, indicators that relate to traditional measures of power-GNP, 
military expenditure etc., are typically used by proponents of the capability perspective. 
Alternatively, indicators that measure a state's commitment to a stable international order 
or an international system of laws are consistently employed by proponents of the 
behavioural perspective. The following chapter will outline the methodology, the various 
empirical measures used on the analysis, and provide a general overview of the data. 
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Chapter Four: Methodology and General Analysis 
The purpose of this chapter is to familiarize the reader with the various elements 
of the analysis, and provide an overview of the data without referencing the results of the 
statistical analysis. The first section of chapter four deals with the three time points 
selected for this analysis, and provides some idea of why the points where selected-
though it notes that such a selection is, ultimately, arbitrary. It also presents the criteria 
by which an a priori classification of middle power states can be derived and lists those 
states that qualify. Sections 4.2 and 4.3 deal directly with the origin of the raw data and 
links each source with the appropriate indicator and category (capability or behaviour). 
The final section presents a rough overview of the data and offers some general 
observations concerning the effectiveness of behaviour and capability as delimiting 
devices. The overview concludes, however, that a rough examination of the data offers 
no real insight in terms of which indicators are responsible for hierarchically arranging 
states. 
4.1) Selecting Small, Middle, and Great Powers and Time Points and for Analysis 
A sample size of fifty cases was selected in order to generate enough data to run 
the discriminant analysis yet small enough so that the research itself did not exceed 
certain time constraints. The sample, following the convention outlined in the literature 
and previous studies, is composed of three types of states: great, middle, and small, and 
the selection methods of the various cases follow below. 
Discriminant analysis requires that we test a classification of groups for one or 
more time points, and one of the purposes of this thesis is to test which indicators best 
differentiate states that have been referenced as middle powers. As demonstrated in the 
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first chapter, the concept of a middle power is a highly contested one, and is at best an 
ambiguous category of states. It is no surprise, therefore, that the literature is far from 
uniform in how it classifies middle powers. Some states that have been referenced as 
middle powers in one context are labelled great or small in another. For example, Neack 
(1991, 1993), classifies Canada as a great power, while Pratt (1989) labels Canada as an 
established middle power. The labelling discrepancy within the literature creates certain 
problems, since the primary hypothesis of this thesis rests on two assumptions: that 
middle power indicators can be identified, and that previous middle power studies, 
though inconclusive, used appropriate indicators. But how can a list of middle powers be 
derived if there are labelling and methodological discrepancies within the literature? The 
simple if arbitrary rule adopted here, is that a state will be classed as a middle power if it 
appears at least three times in the literature surveyed (thus, at least 25% of all the studies 
used here) and is classed as a middle power by authors in both the behavioural and 
capability camps. 1 See Appendix 1.1 for a summary of the classification in the literature. 
Using these rules, the list of middle powers, according to the literature, consists of the 
following states: Canada, Argentina, Australia, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, 
Finland, Poland, Japan, India, South Africa, and Nigeria. 
The small and great powers have been selected in a much less nomothetic manner. 
Chosen somewhat arbitrarily the small and great powers represent most regions of the 
world. The five great powers represent the five states with a permanent seat on the 
Security Council. The remaining states have been defined as such simply on the grounds 
they do not fit within the other two groups. These "other" states, of course, are included 
within the analysis in order to provide the necessary comparative element since middle 
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powers need to be differentiated from other states. Statistically, small and great powers 
have also been included because the dependent variable needs to have some variance. It 
should be noted that using this classification does not predetermine the results. The 
classification is in effect a hypothesis, and the discriminant analysis will demonstrate 
which states are properly and improperly classified. A complete list of the states 
included in this project is provided in appendix 1.2. 
The three time points at which middle powers are studied are 1960, 1990, and 
2000. These were selected for a variety of reasons. The periods were chosen, primarily, 
because they may reflect shifts in assertions of Canada's middle power status. Pre-1960, 
Maureen Molot and Norman Hillmer write: 
no doubts [of Canada's middle power status] were necessary. In the 1940s 
and 1950s, fighting Fascism and Communism and building the institutions of 
a new world order, Canada mattered. The economy was strong and so too 
was the military for most of the period ... The Department of External Affairs 
was led by considerable men-Mackenzie King, Louis St. Laurent, and L.B. 
Pearson- and populated by the young and ambitious. Foreigners began to 
comment on the best bantam foreign office in the world, its diplomats 
exercising an influence, and enjoying a prestige, said the Economist (1953), 
'out of all proportion to the size of their country or the power they can 
wield.'2 
Arthur Andrew commented that during the "Golden Age" of Canadian foreign policy "it 
seem[ed] as if Canada had a destiny to be in all things a Middle Power, an agent of 
influence for moderation in the geopolitical middle; a crossroads and entropot, politically, 
ideologically, culturally, commercially and spiritually."3 The 1990 and 2000 time points 
mark times for which many are critical of Canada's middle power title. As Andrew 
Cohen lamented about both time points (though on dubious empirical grounds) "we have 
created a Potemkin Canada .. .It is not doing what it once did, or as much as it once did, or 
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enjoying the success it once did."4 Even the foreign minister in the Chretien government, 
John Manley, declared- post 9/11-that Canada, 
was still trading on a reputation that was built two generations and more 
ago-but that we haven' t continued to live up to .. . You can't just sit at the G-
8 table and then, when the bill comes, go to the washroom. If you want to 
play a role in the world, even as a small member of the G-8, there's a cost to 
doing that. 5 
The 1960 and 1990 time points are particularly important because of changes occurring 
in the international system. The 1960s were a period of Cold War tension, providing a 
unique opportunity for middle power involvement in international affairs and a 
subsequent analysis of middle powers in general. The end of the Cold War, as Charles-
Phillipe David and Stephane Roussel argued, meant that the unique bipolar system that 
had previously allowed the middle powers to play a specific role and distinguish 
themselves from the great powers no longer existed,6 raising questions as to the 
legitimacy of middlepowermanship as a viable foreign policy and characteristic of a 
middle power. However, despite the arguments presented, the selection of the three time 
points is still an arbitrary decision and a different selection of time points could affect the 
analysis. 
4.2) Empirical Measures of Capability 
The three capability indicators were drawn from simple aggregate sources, and 
therefore there is little need to outline the method by which they were derived, other than 
to state the source. Moreover, each has been selected because a previous study has 
incorporated it; for example, the Holbraad or Wood studies of middle powers, or the 
Handel and Barston studies of powers within the international system. 
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Data for the three capability indicators, total population, total GNP, and total 
military expenditure were gathered from a number of secondary sources. For example, 
population data for the points 1960, 1990 and 2000 were gathered from the United 
Nations Population Division (UNPD) database. 7 GNP data were compiled from two 
different sources, and are listed in millions of current US dollars for 1960, 1990, and 
2000. The 1960 GNP data come from the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
(USACDA), 8 whereas the 1990 and 2000 GNP data come from the UN Statistics 
Division. 9 The GNP data are not comparable over time since they are not corrected for 
inflation. Military expenditure data, like GNP, are presented in millions of US dollars 
and reflect the current value of each time point. The military expenditure data for 1960 
and 1990 were gathered from the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. 10 Military 
expenditure data for 2000 were compiled from the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute (SIPRI), and are again presented in millions of dollars. 11 
4.3) Empirical Measures of Behaviour 
The four behavioural indicators employed here seem to represent best the types of 
behaviour that characterize a middle power, and may not have been employed directly by 
previous middle power studies. Rather, they are an attempt to capture empirically the 
essence of multilateralist or internationalist behaviour. The peacekeeping data consist of 
a state's participation (that is, all the peacekeeping missions for which the state supplied 
troops or equipment) as a percentage of all missions that began or ended during the 
selected time frameY The 1960, 1990, and 2000 data come from the UN peacekeeping 
database.13 Because of the limited number of peacekeeping operations that began or 
ended during the specific years 1960, 1990, and 2000, the inclusion parameters were 
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expanded in order to obtain a more representative sample. The rationale, of course, is 
that such behaviour is more a pattern over time than a single year snapshot, especially 
when a given year might well be atypical. For 1960, this meant expanding the time frame 
from 1956 to 1964, which made it possible to include the four peacekeeping operations 
that occurred during that period (ONUC, UNSF, UNYOM, and UNEF1). Because of the 
dramatic increase in the number of peacekeeping operations over time, the time frames 
for 1990 and 2000 included only those operations that fell between 1990-1995 and 2000-
2005 respectively. The ODA data for 1960 come from the World Bank (WB). 14 The 
data for 1990 and 2000 come from the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP). 15 The measurement, essentially, is aid as a percentage of a state's overall GNP. 
In 1990, Canada, for example, had an ODA level of .44% of its GNP. 16 The payment of 
UN dues data come from the UN Budgetary Report for December 31, 1960, 1990, and 
2000 respectively. 17 The data are calculated as a percentage of assigned dues paid. For 
example, if Mexico was required to pay $50,000 (US) the total amount paid by Mexico at 
the end of the year was calculated as a percentage, total dues paid per unit of assigned 
dues paid. 18 The multilateral agreement data come from the United Nations Treaty 
database. 19 Again, because such behaviour is more a pattern over time, and a single year 
may well be atypical, treaties that originated between the periods 1960-1965, 1990-1995, 
and 2000-2005,20 were deposited with the Secretary-General, and were multilateral in 
character were included in the analysis. A state was considered to support a multilateral 
agreement if it had acceded to or ratified a treaty. Also included were any protocols, 
optional protocols, or treaty amendments that stemmed from those treaties and to which a 
state had either acceded to or ratified. The international conventions that were included 
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range from the International Convention on Human Rights and its amendments to the 
International Convention on Tropical Timber and the International Convention on Grains 
Trade. Conventions or treaties that were ignored were those that were regionally specific 
and addressed a specific regional issue, and therefore excluded states not party to the 
regional issue. For example, the Convention on the Conservation of Small Cetaceans of 
the Baltic and North Seas is relevant only to Baltic and northern European states; hence it 
was excluded from the analysis. The data are presented, again, as a percentage. For 
example, of the twenty multilateral treaties that were concluded within the 1960-1965 
time frame Canada had acceded to or ratified ten, which is presented as 50%. 
4.4) General Observations of the Data 
Before undertaking the discriminant analysis, a general discussion of the data (see 
appendices 1.3, 1.4, and 1.5) is perhaps warranted. Overall, the capability data conform 
to a general pattern. If military expenditure and GNP are compared, for example, a 
hierarchy can be observed (see figure 4.e 1). Generally, the higher the state's rank in 
terms of GNP, the higher its rank in military expenditure; the great powers occupy the top 
right of the graph, the middle powers are located roughly in the center, and the small 
powers (with the exception of some states that might rightly be called middle powers) can 
be found in the lower left. And (though, as expected, this is neither a riveting nor novel 
observation) the data indicate that there is some degree of hierarchy within the 
international system on the basis of military expenditure and GNP, and that hierarchy 
conforms to what the capability perspective generally predicts. That is, capability 
indicators delineate the hierarchical position of states; countries like the United States, 
the United Kingdom etc., are considered great powers because their capabilities are 
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greater than all others. States like Canada have capabilities that rank in the middle 
therefore they are middle powers, etc. This correlation can be seen in all three of the time 
points (see figures 4.2 and 4.3), and Wight, Neack, Lyon and Tomlin, Holbraad and 
Wood's approaches seem to be substantiated. Population too, provides a rough indication 
of state hierarchy, though with much less clarity than military expenditure and GNP. 
Ignoring the outlier India, the middle powers tend to have populations that are greater 
than the small powers and smaller than the great powers (see Appendices 1.3, 1.4, and 
1.5). This measurement is by no means perfect, however, since many of the small 
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powers have populations that are greater than or equal to the middle power group. For 
example, Vietnam, which is a decidedly small power, has a higher population than most 
of the middle powers in each of the time points. 
In terms of behavioural indicators, there is again a general agreement with the 
behavioural perspective in that middle powers exhibit certain behavioural characteristics. 
To varying degrees, each of the assumed middle powers has one behavioural component 
(see figures 4.4, 4.6, 4.9, and 4.12). Canada, for example, exhibits strong peacekeeping 
and multilateral characteristics, and ranks equally high in terms of UN dues 
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payments and ODA. States like South Africa, Poland, India, Nigeria and Argentina, 
which do not have an ODA component of their foreign policy, nevertheless participate in 
multilateral arrangements, peacekeeping, and pay their UN dues. These behavioural 
characteristics, for the most part, separate the middle power states from small and great 
powers alike. For example, in 1960 each of the assumed middle powers ratified more 
multilateral agreements than any of the small powers and in some cases (Finland, 
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Norway, Australia, the Netherlands, and Sweden) more than the great powers (see figures 
4.9, 4.10, and 4.11). Another good example-peacekeeping-which is considered a 
"classic middle power activity''22 generally separated the middle powers from the small 
and great powers. Again, in 1960, we can see that typically only middle powers 
participated in peacekeeping operations with any regularity. In 1990 and 2000 this 
pattern changes somewhat as more states participated in peacekeeping operations; middle 
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powers, though, still participated relatively more frequently than most other states (see 
figures 4.12, 4.13 and 4.14). 
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The general analysis suggests that both the capability and behavioural 
perspectives can, to varying degrees, demonstrate the categorical delineation of states. 
Neither, though, do so with an astounding degree of clarity. While the indicators do point 
to similarities between the identified middle powers, some characteristics-be they 
behavioural or capability- are shared by states that are not considered middle powers. In 
order for the middle power classification to have any meaning, other than as 
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an imprecise reference to a state' s self-defined place in the international hierarchy, there 
must be some degree of consistency and uniqueness amongst the middle power states and 
the capability and behavioural indicators. As Chapnick opined, "[m]iddle powers must 
be demonstrably and objectively different from great and small powers. Without a 
reliable distinction, only rhetoric distinguishes them from their smaller 
contemporaries."23 Perhaps the multivariate discriminant analysis will provide the 
necessary rigour and point to the indicators that characterize a middle power; it is to this 
aspect of the analysis we now tum. 
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Chapter Five: An Empirical Test of the Debate 
The fifth chapter concerns the analysis of the middle power debate usmg a 
statistical method called discriminant analysis. The first section outlines the mechanics 
of discriminant analysis so that readers unfamiliar with the technique might more easily 
interpret the accompanying tables. The second section presents the statistical results and 
their interpretation, and concludes that there are certain indicators that can together 
distinguish between small, middle, and great states. The final section reviews the 
significant indicators for each time point, and concludes that both behaviour and 
capability indicators are useful in determining whether or not a state is a middle power. 
The final section also summarizes for the reader those states that were classified as 
middle powers for each of the time points. 
5.1) The Discriminant Analysis Technique 
Discriminant analysis is used primarily to predict membership, on the basis of 
certain criteria, in two or more mutually exclusive groups where group membership is 
"known"1 for one or more periods.2 Most often discriminant analysis is used within the 
behavioural sciences, economics, and, to a limited degree, in political science. It was 
first developed by R.A. Fisher, who was trying to solve problems in physical 
anthropology and biology. 3 Though, as a statistical tool, it is not as popular as 
correlation or regression techniques, it is, nevertheless, extremely effective for dealing 
with dichotomous, discrete, or nominal dependent variables.4 Simply, discriminant 
analysis creates a regression-like equation that makes use of a dependent variable that is 
discrete rather than continuous-in this case the dependent variable comprises great, 
middle, or small powers. By using pre-existing data in which group membership is 
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already "known," a regression-like equation can be computed that "maximally 
discriminates between the .. . groups."5 In comparison, correlation or regression 
techniques would not be appropriate where the dependent variable is a nominal measure. 
Nor could they provide an indication of which independent variables determine whether 
groups differ, and then use that variable to predict group membership. Correlation and 
regression techniques generally only provide the linear relationship between an 
independent and dependent variables; hence they have little applicability to the current 
question. In general, therefore, discriminant analysis is a very useful tool for detecting the 
variables that allow a researcher to discriminate between different (naturally occurring) 
groups, and for classifying cases into different groups with a better than chance 
accuracy, 6 and is therefore useful for this analysis. 
The discriminant analysis technique employs several complicated mathematical 
steps, and as such presents certain obstacles to the social scientist who may not have 
much formal training in mathematics or statistics. However, with the advent of statistical 
computer programs, like the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS), non-
mathematically trained researchers may employ complicated statistical procedures, like 
discriminant analysis, without much difficulty or headache provided that they first 
become familiar with certain definitions and processes. The following description of the 
discriminant analysis technique is important in understanding the results generated by 
SPSS and the significance of the analysis. It is included to provide the reader with some 
understanding of the results and tables within this chapter.7 
Discriminant analysis works by plotting each of the data points on a graph and 
calculating the distance from the mean of each independent variable and each case. The 
64 
distance from each group, or centroid, is derived by the canonical discriminant function 
which is used to calculate the degree of variance of each independent variable from the 
dependent. Simply, then, the discriminant analysis technique is a MANOV A, or 
multivariate analysis of variance, statistical procedure. The canonical discriminant 
functions are summarized by the eigenvalue, or the mathematical function by which a 
process changes, and reflects the degree by which the discriminant function 
discriminates. A high eigenvalue is associated with a strong discriminant function. 8 In 
other words, the eigenvalues represent the overall utility of the analysis. If the 
discriminant function is summarized by a small eigenvalue the independent variables do 
not provide a good indication of which case belongs to which value of the dependent 
variable. The number of discriminant functions is determined by the number of 
dependent categories minus one (or g-1 ). Thus, because the dependent variable in this 
analysis has three categories, there are two discriminant functions and each discriminant 
function accounts for a percentage of the variance. 
The impact of each of the independent variables is further summarized by the 
standardized canonical discriminant function coefficients, which is a long winded way to 
describe the degree to which the independent variables affect the classification of the 
dependent groups. This coefficient is a measure of "association which summarizes the 
degree of relatedness between the groups and the discriminant function."9 In other 
words, the standardized canonical discriminant function coefficients denote the 
contribution of each variable to the discriminant function. A value of zero implies that 
there is no relationship between the independent and dependent variables, whereas higher 
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values denote increasing degrees of relatedness. Likewise, a negative value indicates an 
inverse relationship of the independent variables with the dependent. 
Though the standardized canonical discriminant function coefficients describe the 
degree to which the independent variables impact the discriminant function, we cannot, 
on the basis of the function coefficients, tell how the cases were categorized. Because 
there are more than two dependent values (in this case) there is more than one 
discriminant function, and from the eigenvalues we can tell which function accounted for 
what percent of the variance. However, this leads to a significant dilemma, since we 
want to know which variables were most important in determining the classification a 
case (state) was assigned. In order to know this, we look to the structure matrix and the 
functions at group centroids. The function at group centroids indicates how far apart the 
mean value of each of the dependent variables was from the other. A high degree of 
separation indicates that the independent variables were able to discriminate between the 
groups. Closely related group centroids indicate that the independent variables were less 
able to distinguish between them. Thus, we can look to the standardized canonical 
coefficients and see which independent variables had the highest impact on the 
discriminant function. Those that were significant ordered the cases into groups (in this 
case large, medium, and small). Therefore, the standardized discriminant function 
coefficients indicate the partial contribution of each independent variable to the 
discriminant functions, controlling for other independents entered in the equation. 
The structure matrix indicates the simple correlations between the variables and 
the discriminant functions. The structure coefficients are used to assign meaningful labels 
to the discriminant functions and the standardized discriminant function coefficients 
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should be used to assess each independent variable's umque contribution to the 
discriminant function. 10 In essence, the canonical coefficients are partial coefficients 
whereas the structure coefficients are not: if a given variable shares variance with other 
variables entered in the linear combination of variables used to create a canonical, its 
canonical coefficient (similar to beta weights in regression analysis) is calculated based 
on the residual variance it can explain after controlling for these variables. That is, if an 
independent variable is totally redundant with the other independent variables, its 
canonical weight (canonical coefficient) will be zero. Nevertheless, such a variable 
might have a high correlation with the canonical variable (that is, a high structure 
coefficient) . Thus, the canonical weights (canonical coefficient) have to do with the 
unique contributions of an original variable to the canonical variable, whereas the 
structure correlations (structure matrix) have to do with the simple, overall correlation of 
the original variable with the canonical variable, and the two have to be examined for 
agreement in order to determine which independents are impacting the organization of 
the dependent variable. 11 The following table is a summary of the various questions the 
discriminant analysis is able to pose and the corresponding statistics. 
Table 5.1 Discriminant Analysis Outline 
Question 
Was the analysis significant? 
Which independent variables were 
significant? 
Which independent variables influenced 
the organization of cases and in which 
function? 
How can we tell which independent 
variables influenced the organization of 
cases and in which function? 
Into which category were each of the cases 
ordered, what percent were accurately 
Statistic 
Eigenvalues, Wilks' Lambda, and the 
Canonical Correlation. 
Standardized Canonical Discriminant 
Function Coefficients. 
Standardized Canonical Discriminant 
Function Coefficients and the Structure 
Matrix. 
Functions at Group Centroids. 
Classification summary, Classification 
results, and each case's discriminant 
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I predicted, and how can we tell? I scores. 
One point concerning the discriminant analysis that deserves further clarification 
relates to the relevant independent variables and the subsequent classification of the 
dependents. Though the independents, in some combination, are directly responsible for 
determining the empirical classification of the dependent case, such a classification does 
not then characterize the dependent case. The difference is subtle so it bears repeating: 
one cannot infer, on the basis of the dependent's classification, the characteristics 
endemic of the dependent. For example, imagine that you were interested in what types 
of variables differentiate, say, clinical psychologists, automotive mechanics, and 
politicians, and you then derived a number of characteristics. These independent 
categories (for argument's sake we will say they are social skills, scholastic aptitude, 
empathy, and mechanical inclination) can then be used to differentiate between the three 
dependent variables. Politicians, for example, may be separated from the other two 
groups on the basis of social skills and empathy. Thus, the discriminant analysis allows 
one to conclude that there is a difference between politicians, mechanics, and 
psychologists on the basis of social skills and empathy, but one cannot conclude that 
politicians are characterized by more highly developed empathetic and social skills. One 
can only conclude that there is a difference between the gr~ups based upon the 
independent variables. Therefore, while discriminant analysis will help one to discern the 
difference between the dependent cases, it will not tell you what the characteristics of the 
dependents groups are. 
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5.2) The Statistical Analysis 
The statistical analysis reveals several interesting features about the hierarchy of 
states and the relevant indicators. As noted in chapter four, the indicators, when 
considered separately, do not clearly defme a special category of middle powers. Indeed, 
a superficial examination of the data leads one to conclude that there are no determining 
factors unique to a middle power group. The discriminant analysis, however, reveals that 
there is a group of states with similar characteristics that can be categorized as middle 
powers, as well as distinct groups of great and small powers. 
Tables 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4 are a summary of the 1960, 1990, and 2000 discriminant 
analysis results. In 1960, we can see that 78% of the cases were "correctly" classified as 
either great, middle, or small (by correctly, it is meant that the independent variables 
together classified that states as the literature does). Four ofthe great, nine of the middle, 
and twenty-six of the small powers were "correctly" classified using the independent 
variables chosen for this analysis. Most notably, Canada was "correctly" predicted as a 
middle power, along with Norway, Italy, the Netherlands, Australia, Finland, India, and 
Sweden. States classified by the literature as small powers but empirically predicted to 
be middle powers were Brazil, Pakistan, Iran, West Germany, and Morocco. The United 
Kingdom, usually classified as a great power, was empirically classified as a middle 
power. States often considered middle powers but empirically classified as small powers 
were Japan, Poland, Argentina, and South Africa. The great powers included the United 
States, the USSR, France, China and, surprisingly, Belgium. However, Belgium's 
empirical prediction as a great power is due to its unique discriminant scores. That is, on 
the basis of the first function its score lies closer to the great power centroid, whereas in 
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the second it is closer to the middle power rather than the great power centroid. 
Statistically speaking, then, it is likely that Belgium is a middle power given its low 
probability score. The same is true for the incorrect empirical prediction of West 
Germany and the United Kingdom as middle powers. However, the other cases which 
differed from their predictions did so because their empirical characteristics fell within 
the parameters of the discriminating indicators. In other words, Brazil, Denmark, Japan, 
Poland, South Africa, Pakistan, Morocco, and Argentina shared characteristics common 
to either the middle or small power groups. 
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Table 5.2 1960 Classification Results 
State 
Group as 
per the Discriminant 
State Literature Scores 
Predicted Function Function 
Group P(D>d I G=g) 1 2 
p df 
Canada 2 2 .590 2 -1.241 1.375 
Denmark 1 2(**) .481 2 -1.129 1.801 
Italy 2 2 .908 2 -.749 1.039 
Norway 2 2 .473 2 -.941 1.952 
Netherlands 2 2 .488 2 .488 1.754 
Australia 2 2 .161 2 1.567 .725 
Sweden 2 2 .208 2 -1 .096 2.489 
Finland 2 2 .732 2 -1.087 .641 
New Zealand 1 1 .962 2 -.887 -.186 
Brazil 1 2(**) .548 2 -1.432 .971 
Japan 2 1(**) .355 2 .609 -.297 
Poland 2 1(**) .953 2 -.565 -.282 
South Africa 2 1(**) .833 2 -.950 -1.047 
Spain 1 1 .974 2 -.741 -.243 
India 2 2 .099 2 1.317 2.263 
Pakistan 1 2(**) .603 2 -1.279 1.239 
United States 3 3 .045 2 7.093 .293 
Mexico 1 1 .980 2 -.820 -.659 
Singapore 1 1 .620 2 -.782 -1.433 
USSR 3 3 .120 2 5.648 -2.010 
Britain 3 2(**) .051 2 2.025 .280 
France 3 3 .423 2 3.474 .366 
Peru 1 1 .531 2 -1.010 -1.567 
Angola 1 1 .440 2 -.795 -1.739 
Morocco 1 2(**) .851 2 -.764 .511 
China 3 3 .899 2 5.039 .054 
Colombia 1 1 .749 2 -1.276 -1 .066 
Venezuela 1 1 .951 2 -.632 -.713 
South Korea 1 1 .980 2 -.779 -.654 
Iran 1 1 .797 2 -1.069 .170 
Saudi Arabia 1 1 .811 2 -.628 -1.074 
Turkey 1 1 .826 2 -.785 -1.073 
Germany(W) 1 2(**) .152 2 1.603 .923 
Vietnam (S) 1 1 .440 2 -.689 -1.731 
Cambodia 1 1 .517 2 -1.032 -1.586 
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Belgium 1 3(**) .046 2 2.268 .457 
Sierra Leone 1 1 .793 2 -1.268 -.972 
Nigeria 2 2 .857 2 -.886 .799 
Uzbekistan 1 1 .531 2 -.744 -1.579 
Turkmenistan 1 1 .620 2 -.783 -1.433 
Cuba 1 1 .923 2 -.582 -.779 
Haiti 1 1 .631 2 -.703 -1.409 
Argentina 2 1(**) .850 2 -.852 .114 
Sudan 1 1 .899 2 -1.250 -.629 
Ethiopia 1 1 .981 2 -.963 -.592 
Jordan 1 1 .601 2 -1.043 -1.441 
Egypt 1 1 .925 2 -.463 -.624 
Greece 1 1 .911 2 -.893 -.881 
Portugal 1 1 .436 2 -1.020 -1.731 
Tunisia 1 1 .840 2 -1.224 -.025 
**Misclassified case 
Classification Results(a) 
State Predicted Group Membership 
Class 1.00 2.00 3.00 Total 
Origina Count 1.00 26 5 1 32 
I 2.00 4 9 0 13 
3.00 0 1 4 5 
% 1.00 81.3 15.6 3.1 100.0 
2.00 30.8 69.2 .0 100.0 
3.00 .0 20.0 80.0 100.0 
a 78.0% of original grouped cases correctly classified. 
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What were the discriminating variables for 1~60? Table 1.6.1 (tables 1.6.1 
through 1.6.15 can be found in Appendix 1.6) is a summary of the 1960 eigenvalues and 
canonical correlations. From it we can see that the first discriminant function had an 
eigenvalue of 3.299 and accounted for 89.2% of the variance whereas the second had an 
eigenvalue of .40 and accounted for only 10.8% of the variance. The canonical 
correlation ofthe first function is .87 and the second is .53. These statistics indicate that 
the first function was the most effective in determining which cases belonged to which 
category and accounts for most of the variance. These results are further confirmed by 
table 1.6.2, which is a summary of the Wilks' Lambda test of functions, which is an 
inverse test of significance. The Wilks' Lambda test, like the eigenvalues and canonical 
correlations, indicates that the first function was the most significant. The significance 
test, however, also indicates the second function is significant even though it plays a 
relatively minor role in establishing the groups of cases. Tables 1.6.3 to 1.6.5 reveal the 
independent variables that discriminated best between the groups for either the first or 
second function. Table 1.6.3 is a summary of the effectiveness of the independent 
variables, 1.6.4 is a summary of the structure matrix, and 1.6.5 is a summary ofthe group 
centroids. By comparing the significant variables in tables 1.6.3 and 1.6.4, we can draw 
some conclusions as to how the cases were organized. From table 1.6.3 we can see that 
in the first function total GNP, total military expenditure, total population, and ODA all 
had a significant impact. The second function was most significantly impacted by 
military expenditure, multilateral agreements and peacekeeping. A glance at table 1.6.4 
indicates that within the first function all three of the significant independent variables 
impacted the classification of the cases. Turning to the second function, we can see that 
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of the three significant variables only peacekeeping and multilateral agreements had a 
high degree of correlation with the discriminant function (therefore we can ignore 
military expenditure since it had no impact on the second function). What can we say 
about the first and second function? In the first instance the discriminant function was 
most influenced by capability indicators (though, of course, ODA had a significant 
impact as well). In Contrast, the second function seems to be most influenced by 
behavioural indicators, which suggests that 89.2% of the variance between small, middle, 
and great powers was accounted for by GNP, military expenditure, population, and ODA, 
while 10.2% of the variance is attributed to peacekeeping and multilateral agreements 
(and to a lesser extent UN Dues). 
The next question is which function best discriminated between each of the 
groups? In other words, were middle powers separated from great and small powers by 
the first or second function, or both? To answer this, we look to table 1.6.5, the functions 
at group centroids, which indicate how the discriminant functions separated the cases. In 
the first function, small and middle powers are separated by a fair margin from the great 
powers. Total GNP, total military expenditure, ODA, and total population worked best in 
separating middle and small power states like Canada, Brazil, and Uzbekistan, from 
states like the United States, China, Russia, and France. Though the first function was 
also able to separate middle powers from small powers on the basis of the four relevant 
independent variables, the distinction between the groups is significantly smaller. As a 
general comment, therefore, we can say that capability indicators distinguish primarily 
between great powers and all other powers. In the second function, middle powers are 
separated from small and great powers by a fair margin; peacekeeping and multilateral 
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agreements best distinguish middle powers from all other powers. That is, Canada, India, 
Finland, etc., were separated (behaviourally) from China, Sierra Leone, Cuba, the United 
States, and France, etc. Obviously, the analysis is not perfect given that there is a degree 
of separation (albeit small) between the small and great power centroids, but as a general 
comment we can say that behavioural indicators worked best at distinguishing middle 
powers from all others and capability worked best at distinguishing great powers from all 
others. 
The 1990 dataset paints a much clearer picture as to how the cases were 
delineated. The discriminant analysis was able to predict correctly 78% of the cases (see 
table 5.3). Most notably, Canada was once again empirically classed as a middle power, 
as were Italy, Norway, the Netherlands, Sweden, Japan, Finland, Nigeria, Argentina, and 
India. The United States, China, and the USSR were once again classified as great 
powers. States that were originally classified by the literature as either small or great 
powers but were empirically predicted to be middle powers· in 1990 were Denmark, 
Belgium, Brazil, Pakistan, France, Turkey, and Germany. Surprisingly, the United 
Kingdom has been classed as a small power, though the probability of the prediction is 
extremely low, suggesting that its classification is due in large part to the 
cantankerousness of the statistical procedure (see the earlier comment concerning 
Belgium's 1960 great power classification). 12 
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Table 5.3 1990 Classification Results 
State 
Group as 
per the Discriminant 
State Literature Scores 
Predicted Function Function 
Group P(D>d I G=g) 1 2 
p df 
Canada 2 2 .854 2 .274 1.673 
Denmark 1 2(**) .898 2 .219 1.591 
Italy 2 2 .775 2 -.008 .458 
Norway 2 2 .126 2 .001 3.206 
Netherlands 2 2 .474 2 .218 2.379 
Australia 2 1(**) .809 2 -.354 .081 
Sweden 2 2 .544 2 .345 2.227 
Finland 2 2 .883 2 .150 .688 
New Zealand 1 1 .788 2 -.458 .181 
Brazil 1 2(**) .931 2 .059 .794 
Japan 2 2 .941 2 -.103 .847 
Poland 2 1(**) .807 2 -.074 -.331 
South Africa 2 1(**) .985 2 -.586 -.345 
Spain 1 1 .405 2 .592 -.757 
India 2 2 .155 2 1.954 1.134 
Pakistan 1 2(**) .705 2 -.737 .824 
United States 3 3 .045 2 6.432 -.186 
Mexico 1 1 .406 2 -.301 -1.734 
Singapore 1 1 .551 2 -1.371 -1.333 
USSR 3 3 .009 2 6.099 -2.667 
Britain 3 1(**) .091 2 1.462 -.654 
France 3 2(**) .340 2 1.490 1.094 
Peru 1 1 .801 2 -1.120 -.988 
Angola 1 1 .519 2 -1.731 .078 
Morocco 1 1 .772 2 -.955 -1.137 
China 3 3 .838 2 4.306 -.001 
Colombia 1 1 .692 2 -1.106 -1.223 
Venezuela 1 1 .688 2 -1.538 -.730 
South Korea 1 1 .456 2 -.309 -1.642 
Iran 1 1 .782 2 -1.083 -1.056 
Saudi Arabia 1 1 .431 2 -1.181 -1.670 
Turkey 1 2(**) .831 2 -.298 .655 
Germany(W) 1 2(**) .399 2 1.168 .445 
Vietnam 1 1 .757 2 -1.434 -.667 
Cambodia 1 1 .854 2 -1.254 -.623 
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Belgium 1 2(**) .771 2 -.164 .476 
Sierra Leone 1 1 .995 2 -.624 -.484 
Nigeria 2 2 .611 2 -.903 1.530 
Uzbekistan 1 1 .998 2 -.766 -.426 
Turkmenistan 1 1 .823 2 -1.286 -.197 
Cuba 1 1 .863 2 -.925 -.958 
Haiti 1 1 .710 2 -1.410 -.002 
Argentina 2 2 .721 2 -.605 1.680 
Sudan 1 1 .714 2 -1.538 -.495 
Ethiopia 1 1 .369 2 -1.991 -1.068 
Jordan 1 1 .460 2 -1.452 .549 
Egypt 1 1 .753 2 -.674 .294 
Greece 1 1 .531 2 -.184 -1.449 
Portugal 1 1 .792 2 -.153 -.841 
Tunisia 1 1 .916 2 -1.131 -.388 
**Mtsclasslfied Case 
Classification Results(a) 
State Predicted Group Membership 
Class 1.00 2.00 3.00 Total 
Origina Count 1.00 26 6 0 32 
1 2.00 3 10 0 13 
3.00 1 1 3 5 
% 1.00 81.3 18.8 .0 100.0 
2.00 23.1 76.9 .0 100.0 
3.00 20.0 20.0 60.0 100.0 
a 78.0% of original grouped cases correctly classified. 
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Tables 1.6.6 and 1.6.7 indicate the significance of the 1990 discriminant analysis 
and the degree of variance accounted for by the first and second function. Again, the first 
function accounts for most of the variance; however, the second function is statistically 
significant and accounts for a fair portion of the total variance. Both functions have high 
degrees of canonical correlation and high eigenvalues. 
What are the discriminating variables for the 1990 dataset? Again, we see that 
military expenditure and population had a significant impact on the first discriminant 
function (see table 1.6.8). The 1990 discriminant analysis differs from the 1960 analysis 
in that no behavioural indicator played a significant role in distinguishing between the 
groups in the first function. In the second function, we see that ODA, peacekeeping, and 
multilateral agreements played a significant role in determining the grouping of cases. 
What is interesting about the 1990 analysis is the clear separation of the dependent 
categories. In the first function, small, middle, and great powers are separated by a wide 
margin, indicating, that on the basis of military expenditure and population, states were 
respectively and distinctly classified as either great, middle, or small powers. In the 
second function, and this is significant, the great and small powers have nearly identical 
centroids (see table 1.6.1 0), which means that the second function, which is exclusively 
behavioural, separated the middle powers from all other states. In other words, the first 
discriminant function used capability indicators to categorize states as either small, 
middle, or great powers, the analysis was further refined by the second function which 
separated middle powers-on the basis of their behaviour- from all other states. 
The final time point analyzed (2000) is less statistically reliable than the previous 
two datasets, though just as interesting. The analysis again classified Canada as middle 
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power, as well as Italy, Norway, the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, Japan, Poland, and 
Nigeria. States assumed to be middle powers but empirically predicted to be small or 
great powers were India (now a great power) and Argentina (now a small power). States 
that are widely assumed to be either small or great powers but empirically predicted to be 
middle powers included Brazil, Spain, Mexico, the United Kingdom, France, Peru, 
Germany, Jordan, and Belgium. The analysis was able to predict correctly 74% of the 
cases (see table 5.4). 
The first function of the 2000 analysis has a high eigenvalue, is statistically 
significant (see tables 1.6.11 and 1.6.12), and accounts for 83.2% of the variance. The 
second function, however, is not as significant. In other words, the usefulness of the 
second function in understanding the categorization of the cases is more difficult to 
ascertain. Nevertheless, a pattern has emerged from the analysis. The first function once 
again separated great, middle, and small powers largely on the basis of military 
expenditure, GNP, population, and peacekeeping, indicators which are largely capability 
in character. The second function, given the first, separated middle powers from all other 
states on the basis of multilateral agreements and ODA. Though it is difficult to say with 
any confidence, it seems as if, again, the middle powers have been separated from other 
states on the basis of behaviour. While it is impossible to say with a high degree of 
certainty, the similarity of the analysis to the two previous makes it likely that this is the 
case. 
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Table 5.4 2000 Classification Results 
State 
Group as 
per the Discriminant 
State Literature Scores 
Predicted Function Function 
Group P(D>d I G=g) 1 2 
p df 
Canada 2 2 .984 2 .176 .767 
Denmark 1 2(**) .365 2 1.354 1.745 
Italy 2 2 .762 2 .160 .026 
Norway 2 2 .552 2 -.037 1.755 
Netherlands 2 2 .932 2 .153 1.056 
Australia 2 1(**) .931 2 -.380 .071 
Sweden 2 2 .372 2 1.440 1.633 
Finland 2 2 .920 2 -.002 .538 
New Zealand 1 1 .892 2 -.528 .242 
Brazil 1 2(**) .998 2 .331 .679 
Japan 2 2 .033 2 .669 3.328 
Poland 2 2 .860 2 .469 .200 
South Africa 2 1(**) .921 2 -.399 .119 
Spain 1 2(**) .927 2 .056 .990 
India 2 3(**) .878 2 2.319 -.281 
Pakistan 1 1 .326 2 .777 -.789 
United States 3 3 .000 2 6.001 -3.650 
Mexico 1 2(**) .424 2 -.887 1.158 
Singapore 1 1 .501 2 -1.441 -1.061 
Russia 3 3 .387 2 1.378 -.458 
Britain 3 2(**) .825 2 .798 .305 
France 3 2(**) .378 2 1.713 1.047 
Peru 1 2(**) .873 2 -.017 .372 
Angola 1 1 .519 2 -1.484 -.970 
Morocco 1 1 .983 2 -.725 -.372 
China 3 3 .458 2 3.873 .001 
Colombia 1 1 .728 2 -1.311 -.611 
Venezuela 1 1 .762 2 -1.336 -.364 
South Korea 1 1 .790 2 -.081 -.663 
Iran 1 1 .420 2 -1.187 -1.414 
Saudi Arabia 1 1 .297 2 -1.189 -1.676 
Turkey 1 1 1.000 2 -.642 -.221 
Germany 1 2(**) .816 2 .552 1.344 
Vietnam 1 1 .831 2 -1.219 -.266 
Cambodia 1 1 .628 2 -1.450 -.707 
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Belgium 1 2(**) .940 2 .081 .516 
Sierra Leone 1 1 .735 2 -1 .395 -.164 
Nigeria 2 2 .854 2 .392 .177 
Uzbekistan 1 1 .480 2 -1.473 -1.081 
Turkmenistan 1 1 .454 2 -1.527 -1.089 
Cuba 1 1 .444 2 -1.288 -1.309 
Haiti 1 1 .303 2 -1.338 -1.592 
Argentina 2 1(**) .882 2 -.361 .205 
Sudan 1 1 .602 2 -1.419 -.832 
Ethiopia 1 1 .870 2 -.899 -.672 
Jordan 1 2(**) .447 2 .643 -.497 
Egypt 1 1 .686 2 .257 -.235 
Greece 1 1 .980 2 -.573 -.425 
Portugal 1 1 .834 2 -.879 .313 
Tunisia 1 1 .980 2 -.752 -.087 
**Misclassified Case 
Classification Results(a) 
State Predicted Group Membership 
Class 1.00 2.00 3.00 Total 
Origina Count 1.00 25 7 0 32 
1 2.00 3 9 1 13 
3.00 0 2 3 5 
% 1.00 78.1 21.9 .0 100.0 
2.00 23.1 69.2 7.7 100.0 
3.00 .0 40.0 60.0 100.0 
. . 
a 74.0% of ongmal grouped cases correctly classified. 
t 
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5.3) Middle Powers and Indicators Over Time 
Generally, the statistical analysis allows one to conclude that capability and behaviour 
each play a role in determining whether a state is a small, middle, or great power. 
Moreover, one can conclude, with a fair degree of certainty, that behavioural 
characteristics tend to differentiate middle powers from all others to a considerable 
degree. The analysis also indicates that Canada was and remains a middle power on the 
basis of the selected behavioural and capability indicators. Table 5.5 is a summary of the 
predicted middle powers over time, and the middle power classification of certain states 
is remarkably consistent. The usual suspects-Canada, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands 
etc-have been classified as middle powers for each of the time points, and states that 
might not normally be associated with the middle power moniker, like the United 
Kingdom, have also been categorized as middle powers with some regularity. 
Table 5.5 Predicted Middle Powers over Time 
1960 1990 2000 
Canada Canada Canada 
Argentina Argentina 
Australia 
Belgium Belgium 
Brazil Brazil Brazil 
Denmark Denmark Denmark 
Finland Finland Finland 
France France 
Germany Germany 
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India India 
Italy Italy Italy 
Japan Japan 
Mexico 
Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands 
Nigeria Nigeria Nigeria 
Norway Norway Norway 
Peru 
Poland 
Spain 
Turkey 
United Kingdom United Kingdom 
Table 5.6 is a summary of the indicators found to categorize states for each of the time 
points. Again, we can see that there is some consistency in terms of the indicators used 
to differentiate states. The first function for each of the datasets-which was generally 
responsible for determining if a state was either a small, middle, or great power 
(particularly in the 1990 and 2000 analysis)-is composed primarily of capability 
indicators. Total military expenditure and total population were appeared in each of the 
time points, while total GNP appeared in two of the three. The second function, which 
separated middle powers from all other states, is exclusively behavioural in character. 
Multilateral agreements (used for each of the time points), peacekeeping, and ODA13 
played a role in determining whether a state was classified as a middle power. 
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Table 5.6 Discriminating Characteristics over Time 
Function 11 
1960 
Military Expenditure 
Population 
GNP 
ODA 
Function 2 I Multilateral 
Agreements 
Peacekeeping 
1990 2000 
Military Expenditure Military Expenditure 
Population Population 
Multilateral 
Agreements 
Peacekeeping 
ODA 
GNP 
Peacekeeping 
Multilateral 
Agreements 
ODA 
The discriminant analysis allows for the following tentative conclusions: firstly, 
capability can generally determine whether a state is a small, middle, or great power; 
secondly, behavioural indicators distinguish between middle powers and all others; and 
finally, Canada, on the basis of the seven selected indicators, is and was a middle power. 
Intuitively, the results make a great deal of sense. It seems logical to separate great, 
middle, and small states from one another on the basis of capability, and to then refine 
that classification on the basis of behaviour. This was the approach identified by Cox and 
Belanger and Mace, and echoes the sentiments of Riddell. Cox suggested that possessing 
mid range capability allows a state to play a middle power role. 14 Belanger and Mace 
also suggested that middle powers occupy a place in the hierarchy of powers that is 
below the great powers and model their behaviour in a manner consistent with assumed 
middle power roles. 15 And Riddell's comments, though not phrased explicitly in terms of 
mid-range capabilities and middle power roles, nonetheless fit within a capability and 
behaviour framework. 16 
1 The term "known" is used in the sense that the hierarchical designation of states- as great, middle, or 
small-is assumed. That is, the term is used to satisfy the discriminant analysis requirement of an a priori 
classification of the dependent variable, and does not suggest that the delineation of states is proven or 
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established beyond reasonable doubt, but rather reflects the method by which the middle power 
classification of states was decided. 
2 Darren George and Paul Mallery, SPSS for Windows Step by Step: A Simple Guide and Reference (4th ed) 
(New York: Allyn and Bacon, 2003) 278. 
3 William Klecka, Discriminant Analysis (London: Sage Publications, 1980) 12. 
4 Lawrence Mayer and Philip Burgess, "Contrasting Regression and Correlation Analysis with 
Discriminant Analysis for Investigating Nominal Measures of Behaviour" Behavioural Sciences 
Laboratory Research Report #014 (1970) 24. 
5 George and Mallery, SPSSfor Windows Step by Step 278. 
6 Mayer and Burgess. "Contrasting Regression and Correlation Analysis with Discriminant Analysis for 
Investigating Nominal Measures of Behaviour" 28 . 
7 The mathematically inclined reader may benefit from Carl J. Huberty's Applied Discriminant Analysis 
(John Wiley and Sons: London, 1994) for a more complete understanding of discriminant analysis, in 
particular multivariate descriptive discriminant analysis. 
George and Mallery, SPSSfor Windows Step by Step 371. 
9 Klecka, Discriminant Analysis 36. 
1° For a more thorough discussion of the mechanics of discriminant analysis see David G. Garson. 
"Multivariate Discriminant Function Analysis" (www2.chass.ncsu.edu/garson/pa765/ discrim3.htrn) 
accessed January 9/05. For a discussion of discriminant analysis in political science see Mark Daniels and 
R. Darcy, "Notes on the Use and Interpretation of Discriminant Analysis" American Journal of Political 
Science Vol. 27 No.2 (Summer 1989) 359-382; John Aldrich and Charles Cnudde, "Probing the Bounds of 
Conventional Wisdom: A Comparison of Regression, Probit, and Discriminant Analysis" American 
Journal of Political Science Vol. 19 No.3 (August 1975) 571-609; and Ellen R. Girden, Evaluating 
Research Articles from Start to Finish (Sage Publications: London, 1996) 153-190. 
11 Garson, "Multivariate Discriminant Function Analysis". 
12 The discriminant scores for the United Kingdom for function one (1.462) and two (-.654) provide a better 
understanding of its classification. In the first function, the United Kingdom's discriminant score is in-
between the great and middle power group centroids. In the second function though, because the great and 
small powers centroids are almost identical the statistical routine is unable to distinguish between great and 
small powers. Thus, the ambiguity of the United Kingdom's first discriminant score coupled with the 
almost identical group centroids in the second function make its classification as a small power erroneous 
though statistically possible. 
13 As noted previously, the use of ODA would seemingly limit the classification of states as middle powers 
to developed Western states with an ODA component of their foreign policy. Indeed, this statement is true 
since ODA does play a role in organizing the middle power cases in the 1990 and 2000 analyses. IfODA 
is removed from the analysis, and without getting into any of the statistical details, we find that various 
non-Western powers previously considered small powers become middle powers, and some smaller 
Western powers previously considered middle powers become small powers. Obviously, the decision to 
include ODA will affect any classification of states as middle powers. 
14 Cox, "Middlepowerrnanship, Japan, and Future World Order" 245. 
15 Belanger and Mace, "Middle Power and Regionalism in the Americas: The Cases of Argentina and 
Mexico" 171. 
16 Eayrs, "Defining a New Place for Canada in the Hierarchy of World Power" International Perspectives 
(May-June) 1975, 20. 
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Chapter Six: Conclusion 
This thesis was an attempt to add to the growmg and diverse literature on 
Canada's place in the world. The analysis took empirical indicators (over a forty year 
period) usually mentioned as important in gauging a state's hierarchical rank, and linked 
them systematically and collectively to three categories of states-as conventionally 
identified-in order to test the following hypothesis: capability and behavioural 
indicators are able to indicate which states are middle powers. As such, this thesis has 
been moderately successful. It has demonstrated that both behaviour and capability do 
play a role in the hierarchical organization of states; specifically, in the middle power 
classification of states. Secondly, it has shown that combining both types of indicators 
provides a better and more comprehensive classification of states. Thirdly, it has shown 
that Canada, contrary to many of the critics' claims, was and remains a middle power. In 
terms of the seven selected indicators, the analysis has shown that the "revisionist" 
assertion that Canada is a great or small power is wide of the mark. 
There are also several corollary issues that have emerged from this thesis. Firstly, 
the discriminant analysis has shown, with respect to the indicators used here, that there is 
a distinct group of middle powers, whose membership generally conforms to what the 
literature predicts. For example, Italy, Finland, Japan, etc., are all labelled as middle 
powers. The implication, of course, is that capability and behaviour are useful categories 
by which to empirically investigate a state's middle power claim. 
This leads, conveniently, to the second issue: the role capability and behaviour 
play in delimiting states. The discriminant analysis indicates that both capability and 
behavioural indicators are useful in verifying a state's middle power claim. Moreover, it 
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suggests that both are necessary if one seeks to more accurately describe the international 
landscape. Consequently, previous middle power studies, though consisting of 
appropriate indicators, could benefit from a more broad and inclusive approach. Granted, 
there are middle power studies that relied solely on either perspective, and whose 
predictions concerning which states are middle powers is born out in the discriminant 
analysis. Pratt's (1989) study, for example, correctly labelled Canada, the Netherlands, 
Norway, and Sweden as middle powers solely on the basis ofbehaviour. However, such 
an approach ignores the "fact" that capabilities are an important consideration when 
defining middle powers. In Pratt's analysis, the necessity for capabilities might have 
been assumed, given that his selected cases were all wealthy western states. However, in 
Pratt's case this is an implicit rather than explicit criterion, and it is necessary to 
specifically outline the measures by which one chooses middle power states. More 
commonly, studies that relied on either the behavioural or capability perspective 
misclassified states as great, middle, or small. For example, Neack (1991, 1993) and 
Lyon and Tomlin's (1979) studies concluded that Canada was a great power on the basis 
of its capabilities. Wood (1988) and Holbraad's (1984) studies of middle power, based 
solely upon capability indicators, found numerous states that when examined from both a 
behavioural and capability view do not qualify as middle powers. The same comment is 
true for behavioural studies. Jordaan's (2003) analysis suggested that South Africa was a 
good middle power candidate. The discriminant analysis for 1960, 1990, and 2000 
suggests that this is not the case. Likewise, Cooper Higgott and Nossal's (1993) study 
contended that Australia was a middle power, again on the basis of behaviour. The 
statistical analysis, though, classified Australia as a middle power for the 1960 time point, 
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and as a small power for 1990 and 2000. On the contrary, Cox's (1996) case, which 
suggested the utility of employing both types of indicators, proposed that Japan qualified 
as a middle power. The discriminant analysis has verified that assumption, given that 
Japan was classified as a middle power for 1990 and 2000. Mace and Belanger's 
assumption that behaviour and capability together more accurately identify middle 
powers is also born out (though not as nicely) in this analysis. Both Argentina (1960, 
1990) and Mexico (2000) were classified as middle powers. Again, the analysis suggests 
that a more clear and well-defined picture of the international landscape can be obtained 
by employing both behavioural and capability indicators. 
Finally, the middle power concept is not an absolute but relative one, and thus 
states that are purported to be middle powers must be gauged relative to great and small 
powers. Moreover, it is a concept that should be rooted in both capability and behaviour 
indicators. The implicit argument, then, is that previous middle power studies that were 
either behavioural or capability based and failed to compare middle power states to other 
types lacked an overall conception of what constitutes a middle power. These studies 
consequently identified some states to be middle powers when the empirical 
classification suggests otherwise; alternatively, some studies classified some middle 
power states as great powers. The discriminant analysis suggests the inherent weakness 
of middle power studies that categorize states on an intuitive basis rather than an 
empirical one. Again, looking at Cooper, Higgott and Nossal ' s (1993) study, we can see 
the intuitive or idiosyncratic reasons why Australia might be considered a middle power. 
It is a wealthy state with a foreign aid program, contributes to United Nations 
peacekeeping operations, supports multilateral agreements and processes, and is a 
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regional "big power". However, in comparison to other middle power states, Australia 
falls short in terms of the selected indicators. Jordaan's (2003) study also proposes a 
state for middle power candidacy that intuitively one might consider valid. South Africa 
is a wealthy regional leader with abundant resources and is committed to 
internationalism. Nevertheless, in comparison to other states, it fails to qualify. The same 
holds true of states typically assumed to be great or small powers. France and the United 
Kingdom are examples of states listed in the literature as typically great powers, while 
Brazil is typically listed as a small power (Neack, 1991; Holbraad, 1989), yet when 
examined in relation to the seven selected indicators, each is classed as a middle power. 
In spite of the encouraging correspondence of results and ability of the 
discriminant analysis to separate states into three categories on the basis of behaviour and 
capability indicators, there are several weaknesses in the analysis and much room for 
further development and thought. A major problem, and one which has plagued previous 
middle power studies, is the initial selection of middle power states. It would be 
relatively easy to develop a list of middle powers and then find the characteristics that are 
common to the group. By selecting states that have been previously referenced as middle 
powers by both the behavioural and capability camps, I hoped to avoid this fallacy, if 
only indirectly. However, there is a latent quality to this problem which taints the 
validity of the analysis. Another potential weakness lies in the chosen indicators. There 
are perhaps hundreds of alternative measures of "middlepowerism," and some perhaps 
that would in some sense be better or more precise. Using a different set of indicators 
could significantly alter the findings, as could a larger and more complete sample size-
though this would be difficult to do for 1960. 
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Despite these weaknesses, there is still some utility in the present analysis, in that 
a few general observations can be made. Most notably, using the indicators here, Canada 
remains a middle power despite slight declines, in certain respects, in ODA, total military 
expenditure, and peacekeeping involvement. Second, that there are specific behavioural 
characteristics that are common to a group of states which can be duly designated as 
middle powers, and capability and behaviour each have a role in legitimizing a state's 
middle power claim. With further refinement and research, the middle power idea could 
become a more effective and more precise concept for understanding the hierarchy of 
states. Moreover, further analysis could legitimize the rank, role, and influence of states 
like Canada within the international community, and provide a more useful 
organizational tool and method by which to predict state behaviour. 
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State 
X X X X X X X X X X Canada 
X X X X X Argentina 
X X Colombia 
X X Costa Rica 
X X Cuba 
X Dominican 
Republic 
X Ecuador 
X X Jamaica 
X X X X Mexico 
X X Panama 
X X Paraguay 
X X Peru 
X Trinidad/ 
Tobago 
X X Uruguay 
X X Venezuela 
X X Greece 
X X Iceland 
X X X X Italy 
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X Luxembourg 
X X Brazil 
X X X X X X X Australia 
X X X X Netherlands 
X X X Norway 
X X X X X Sweden 
X X X Finland 
X X NewZeal 
X X Portugal 
X X X Spain 
X X Bulgaria 
X Czech 
X X Hungary 
X X X X X Poland 
X Romania 
X Albania 
X X Austria 
X X Ireland 
X Cyprus 
X Lebanon 
X Sri Lanka 
X X X Indonesia 
X X X Japan 
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X X South Korea 
X X X Yugoslavia 
X X Malaysia 
X Mongolia 
X Philippines 
X X Taiwan 
X Thailand 
X X X Iran 
X X X X X India 
X X Pakistan 
X Algeria 
X X X South Africa 
X X Turkey 
X X X Denmark 
X X X Nigeria 
X X X China 
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X X Switzerland 
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Appendix 1.2 Small, Middle, and Great Powers in the Analysis 
Small Powers Middle Powers Great Powers 
Denmark Brazil Canada United States 
New Zealand Spain Italy China 
Pakistan Mexico Norway United Kingdom 
Sin_g~ore Peru Netherlands Russian Federation 
Angola Morocco Australia France 
Colombia Venezuela Sweden 
South Korea Iran Finland 
Saudi Arabia Turkey Japan 
Germany(W) Vietnam Poland 
Cambodia Belgium India 
Sierra Leone Uzbekistan South Africa 
Turkmenistan Cuba Nigeria 
Haiti Sudan Argentina 
Ethiopia Jordan 
Egypt Greece 
Portugal Tunisia 
Appendix 1.3 1960 Dataset 
State GNP MilExp Pop ODA Multi PeaceK UN dues 
Canada 38600 1694 17909 0.19 0.5 1 1 
Denmark 6600 170 4581 0.13 0.85 0.75 1 
Italy 37400 1199 50200 0.1 0.65 0.5 .81 
Norway 4900 165 3581 0.16 0.9 0.75 1 
Netherlands 12500 556 11487 0.36 0.95 0.5 1 
Australia 6800 73 10276 0.53 0.75 0.25 1 
Sweden 14300 601 7480 0.19 0.9 1 1 
Finland 5500 98 4430 0.02 0.8 0.25 1 
New Zealand 3000 148 2372 0 0.7 0 1 
Brazil 14116 232 72742 0 0.55 0.75 1 
Japan 53130 485 94096 0.27 0.45 0 1 
Poland 20400 950 29638 0 0.55 0 .56 
South Africa 7567 91 17396 0 0.4 0 1 
Spain 11800 344 30455 0 0.65 0 1 
India 30861 703 442344 0 0.6 1 .9 
Pakistan 8136 222 48767 0 0.55 0.75 .39 
United States 520100 47808 186158 0.58 0.6 0.25 1 
Mexico 13208 89 36945 0 0.5 0 1 
Singapore 1634 0 0.25 0 
USSR 247000 39000 119906 0 0.55 0 .55 
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Britain 77100 4788 51572 0.47 0.7 0 1 
France 66500 4131 45684 0.76 0.7 0 1 
Peru 2354 67 9931 0 0.25 0 1 
Angola 4816 0 0.15 0 
Morocco 1772 49 11626 0 0.6 0.25 .11 
China 56000 4000 657492 0 0.3 0 .12 
Colombia 3073 54 16857 0 0.25 0.25 .99 
Venezuela 7240 153 7579 0 0.35 0 .12 
South Korea 2651 128 11430 0 0.5 0 
Iran 4249 185 21704 0 0.65 0.25 1 
Saudi Arabia 672 78 4075 0 0.25 0 .11 
Turkey 5500 302 28233 0 0.4 0 1 
Germany 
(W) 81500 3294 72815 0.4 0.8 0 
Vietnam (S) 1395 234 33648 0 0.15 0 
Cambodia 623 36 5433 0 0.25 0 1 
Belgium 12100 391 9153 0.6 0.8 0 .98 
Sierra Leone 220 3 2242 0 0.25 0.25 
Nigeria 3826 23 37446 0 0.5 0.5 0 
Uzbekistan 8559 0 0.2 0 
Turkmenistan 1594 0 0.25 0 
Cuba 2300 175 6985 0 0.35 0 .15 
Haiti 300 7 3803 0 0.15 0 .16 
Argentina 14255 398 20616 0 0.45 0.25 .15 
Sudan 1115 18 11422 0 0.4 0.25 1 
Ethiopia 993 18 4581 0 0.25 0.25 .12 
Jordan 367 53 896 0 0.3 0 1 
Egypt 27840 0 0.5 0 
Greece 4000 168 8334 0 0.45 0 .89 
Portugal 2700 171 8858 0 0.2 0 1 
Tunisia 537 19 4221 0 0.6 0.25 1 
Appendix 1.4 1990 Dataset 
State GNP MilExp Pop ODA Multi PeaceK UNdues 
Canada 574204 11610 27701 0.44 0.74 0.82 1 
Denmark 133361 2535 5140 0.94 0.85 0.35 1 
Italy 1102438 23290 56719 0.31 0.59 0.41 1 
Norway 116107 3210 4241 1.17 0.81 0.59 1 
Netherlands 294758 7155 14952 0.92 0.81 0.59 1 
Australia 310588 6434 16888 0.34 0.63 0.35 1 
Sweden 240153 6062 8559 0.91 0.85 0.59 1 
Finland 136969 1986 4986 0.65 0.81 0.35 1 
New Zealand 43618 796 3360 0.23 0.63 0.53 1 
Brazil 438256 6617 148809 0 0.51 0.47 .28 
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Japan 3053144 30250 123537 0.31 0.48 0.12 1 
Poland 61422 8752 38111 0 0.63 0.65 1 
South Africa 112014 4411 36848 0 0.44 0 0 
Spain 509967 9126 39303 0.2 0.81 0.35 1 
India 324250 7487 846418 0 0.48 0.65 .99 
Pakistan 47239 2829 110901 0 0.44 0.82 1 
United States 5750800 306200 255712 0.21 0.48 0.59 .51 
Mexico 262710 1087 83225 0 0.59 0.05 .96 
Singapore 36901 1627 3016 0 0.4 0.12 1 
USSR 967267 292000 148292 0 0.51 0.65 .09 
Britain 989564 40660 56761 0.27 0.85 0.41 1 
France 1215893 40820 56735 0.6 0.88 0.59 1 
Peru 31140 795 21753 0 0.4 0 .52 
Angola 10295 9340 0 0.11 0 .02 
Morocco 25824 1296 24564 0 0.48 0.24 1 
China 383013 50310 1155305 0 0.59 0.47 1 
Colombia 47743 867 34970 0 0.44 0.17 1 
Venezuela 48598 927 20515 0 0.33 0.17 .83 
South Korea 252622 10800 19956 0 0.59 0.17 .99 
Iran 90368 5213 56703 0 0.37 0 .62 
Saudi Arabia 104671 23160 16554 0 0.33 0.05 1 
Turkey 150676 4985 57593 0 0.48 0.35 .01 
Germany(W) 1671312 41280 79433 0.42 0.77 0.41 1 
Vietnam 6472 723 66074 0 0.29 0 .51 
Cambodia 1730 9744 0 0.25 0 .27 
Belgium 197174 4486 9967 0.46 0.7 0.41 1 
Sierra Leone 635 5 4054 0 0.48 0 .01 
Nigeria 32424 193 86018 0 0.37 0.71 .39 
Uzbekistan 48694 20515 0 0.33 0 .02 
Turkmenistan 11411 3668 0 0.22 0 .02 
Cuba 19645 1400 10628 0 0.44 0 .41 
Haiti 2614 53 6914 0 0.29 0 0 
Argentina 141353 2979 32527 0 0.44 0.71 .13 
Sudan 33641 1059 24927 0 0.29 0.05 .47 
Ethiopia 8128 1384 48856 0 0.22 0.05 1 
Jordan 4020 484 3254 0 0.37 0.71 1 
Egypt 71060 1083 55768 0 0.51 0.71 1 
Greece 84074 3832 10160 0 0.66 0.29 1 
Portugal 71466 2020 9899 0.24 0.7 0.24 1 
Tunisia 12314 389 8207 0 0.44 0.41 .9 
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Appendix 1.5 2000 Dataset 
State GNP MilExp Pop ODA Multi PeaceK UN dues 
Canada 713791 8292 30769 0.22 0.33 0.35 1 
Denmark 158451 2393 5322 1.03 0.41 0.57 1 
Italy 1074763 22411 57536 0.15 0.21 0.28 1 
Norway 166905 2922 4473 0.83 0.54 0.14 1 
Netherlands 370638 5972 15898 0.82 0.29 0.21 1 
Australia 388043 6973 19153 0.25 0.21 0.21 1 
Sweden 239567 4861 8856 0.81 0.46 0.64 1 
Finland 119905 1517 5177 0.32 0.33 0.35 1 
New Zealand 51690 650 3784 0.25 0.29 0.21 1 
Brazil 601732 7644 171796 0 0.41 0.35 1 
Japan 4763833 45793 127034 0.23 0.29 0 1 
Poland 164146 3046 38671 0 0.33 0.57 1 
South Africa 128022 1878 44000 0 0.33 0.28 1 
Spain 561759 7001 40752 0.3 0.41 0.28 1 
India 468229 10900 1016938 0 0.16 0.35 1 
Pakistan 63679 2867 142654 0 0.04 0.64 0.16 
United States 9762100 301697 285003 0.11 0.08 0.35 0.46 
Mexico 580756 2997 98933 0 0.54 0 1 
Singapore 91475 4331 4016 0 0.04 0 1 
Russia 259718 9700 145612 0 0.16 0.78 1 
Britain 1439281 35677 58689 0.32 0.29 0.35 1 
France 1308400 33814 59296 0.6 0.41 0.57 1 
Peru 53089 1056 25952 0 0.41 0.42 0.66 
Angola 9130 438 12386 0 0.04 0 1 
Morocco 33335 1378 29108 0 0.21 0.21 1 
China 1080415 22000 1275215 0 0.16 0.57 1 
Colombia 83766 2843 42120 0 0.16 0 1 
Venezuela 121258 1791 24277 0 0.21 0 0.04 
South Korea 461520 12801 46835 0 0.12 0.35 1 
Iran 102930 12432 66443 0 0.04 0 0.91 
Saudi Arabia 188693 19991 22147 0 0.04 0 1 
Turkey 199264 9994 68281 0 0.33 0.14 1 
Germany 1870277 28150 82282 0.42 0.33 0.21 1 
Vietnam 31349 468 78137 0 0.25 0 1 
Cambodia 3367 118 13147 0 0.12 0 1 
Belgium 228295 3191 10251 0.37 0.29 0.35 1 
Sierra Leone 636 22.9 4415 0 0.29 0 0 
Nigeria 42246 369 114746 0 0.33 0.5 1 
Uzbekistan 13759 222 24913 0 0 0 1 
Turkmenistan 4932 121 4643 0 0 0 0.14 
Cuba 27635 11202 0 0.12 0 1 
Haiti 3515 8005 0 0.04 0 1 
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Argentina 284346 3741 37047 0 0.33 0.28 0 
Sudan 11549 327 31437 0 0.08 0 1 
Ethiopia 6019 618 65590 0 0.12 0.14 1 
Jordan 7709 749 5035 0 0.12 0.71 1 
Egypt 103311 2314 67784 0 0.21 0.5 1 
Greece 113461 5455 10903 0.17 0.16 0.21 1 
Portugal 106457 2204 10016 0.25 0.33 0.07 1 
Tunisia 19444 322 9519 0 0.29 0.21 1 
Appendix 1.6 Discriminant Analysis Results: 1960, 1990, and 2000 
Table 1.6.11960 Eigenvalues and Canonical Correlations Eigenvalues 
Functio % of Cumulative Canonical 
n Eigenvalue Variance % Correlation 
1 3.299(a) 89.2 89.2 .876 
2 .401(a) 10.8 100.0 .535 
a First 2 canonical discriminant functions were used in the analysis. 
Table 1.6.2 1960 Wilks' Lambda Significance Test 
Test of Wilks' Chi-
Function( s) Lambda square Df Sig. 
1 through 2 .166 62.836 14 .000 
2 .714 11.790 6 .067 
Table 1.6.3 1960 Standardized Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients 
Function 
1 2 
GNP -.851 .599 
Military 
1.552 -.727 
Expenditure 
Population .902 .144 
ODA .911 .075 
Multilateral 
.077 .604 
Agreements 
Peacekeeping -.370 .558 
UN Dues -.173 -.220 
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Table 1.6.4 1960 Structure Matrix 
Function 
1 2 
GNP .529(*) -.024 
Military 
.521(*) -.145 
expenditure 
Population .327(*) .173 
Peacekeeping -.108 .801(*) 
Multilateral 
.081 .727(*) 
Agreements 
ODA .328 .341(*) 
UN Dues -.009 .124(*) 
* Largest absolute correlation between each variable and any discriminant function 
Table 1.6.5 1960 Functions at Group Centroids 
State Function 
Rank 1 2 
1.00 -.821 -.457 
2.00 -.337 .886 
3.00 4.656 -.204 
Unstandardized canonical discriminant functions evaluated at group means 
Table 1.6.6 1990 Eigenvalues and Canonical Correlations 
Function 
1 
2 
%of Cumulative Canonical 
Eigenvalue Variance % 
2.157 78.9 
.578 21.1 
78.9 
100.0 
Correlation 
.827 
.605 
Table 1.6.7 1990 Wilks' Lambda Significance Test 
Test of 
Function( s) 
1 through 2 
2 
Wilks' 
Lambda 
.201 
.634 
Chi-
square 
64.237 
18.251 
Df 
14 
6 
Sig. 
.000 
.006 
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Table 1.6.8 1990 Standardized Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients 
Function 
1 2 
GNP .016 .448 
Military 
.902 -.695 
expenditure 
Population .623 .215 
ODA -.109 .988 
Multilateral 
.720 -.417 
agreements 
Peacekeeping .027 .709 
UN Dues -.166 -.512 
Table 1.6.9 1990 Structure Matrix 
Function 
1 2 
Military 
.694(*) -.258 
expenditure 
GNP .436(*) .053 
Population .341(*) .056 
ODA .099 .604(*) 
Peacekeeping .269 .538(*) 
Multilateral 
.213 .364(*) 
agreements 
UN Dues -.028 .081(*) 
* Largest absolute correlation between each variable and any discriminant function 
Table 1.6.10 1990 Functions at Group Centroids 
State Function 
Rank 1 2 
1.00 -.718 -.458 
2.00 .024 1.171 
3.00 3.958 -.483 
Unstandardized canonical discriminant functions evaluated at group means 
Table 1.6.11 2000 Eigenvalues 
% of Cumulative Canonical 
Function Eigenvalue Variance % Correlation 
1 1.131(a) 83 .2 83.2 .729 
2 .228(a) 16.8 100.0 .431 
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Table 1.6.12 2000 Wilks' Lambda Significance Test 
Test of Wilks' Chi-
Function( s) Lambda square Df Sig. 
1 through 2 .382 40.389 14 .000 
2 .815 8.613 6 .197 
Table 1.6.13 2000 Standardized Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients 
Function 
1 2 
GNP .275 1.547 
Military 
.475 -1.786 
expenditure 
Population .519 .046 
ODA .220 .335 
Multilateral 
.061 .428 
agreements 
Peacekeeping .597 .072 
UN Dues .055 -.097 
Table 1.6.14 2000 Structure Matrix 
Function 
1 2 
Military 
.555(*) -.424 
expenditure 
GNP .541(*) -.167 
Peacekeeping .514(*) .176 
Population .447(*) -.072 
Multilateral 
.093 .741(*) 
agreements 
ODA .186 .570(*) 
UN Dues .043 .160(*) 
* Largest absolute correlation between each variable and any discriminant function 
Table 1.6.15 2000 Functions at Group Centroids 
State Function 
Rank 1 2 
1.00 -.612 -.230 
2.00 .350 .742 
3.00 2.760 -.550 
Unstandardized canonical discriminant functions evaluated at group means 
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